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The United States Supreme Court recently held in Eastman Kodak Company
v. Image Technical Services' that Kodak's alleged restraint of trade and monop-
olization of the market for servicing its copiers and other equipment would, if
proven, violate the antitrust laws. The importance of the case is that the court
so held even though it was conceded, for purposes of the appealed from summary
judgment for Kodak, that Kodak had no market power in the market for its
original equipment. Three of the Justices dissented. The majority and dissenting
opinions reflect the vigorous disagreement over the broader issue of whether
competition in replacement parts and repair services (the "aftermarket' ")2 for a
single brand of equipment is necessary or even desirable - whether an original
equipment manufacturer ("OEM") should have the legal right to prevent others
from copying the unpatented OEM created designs of components for its equip-
ment.
This disagreement is reflected not only in the Kodak opinion and earlier
opinions dealing with the similar issues,3 but also in over seventy years of lobbying
efforts, led more recently by OEMs, especially automobile companies, to obtain
protection for designs from Congress. That includes 45 bills introduced between
1914 and 1950 with a copyright office bibliography running 160 pages. 4
A design patent statute protecting designs that are new, original, ornamental,
non-obvious and not "dictated by functional requirements" already exists.5
However, the "non-obvious" and "non-functional" requirements severely limit
the applicability of that act to replacement parts. 6
Modern technology such as computer controlled machine tools apparently
makes production of parts in smaller quantities more competitive and reduces
the OEMs' cost advantage in obtaining such parts. The result has been a
resurgence of OEM interest in legal methods to prevent copying of their parts
for the replacement market. The present thrust of their efforts is to obtain
copyright protection for the design of the parts that would prohibit copying the
* B.A. Michigan State Univ., 1956; J.D. University of Chicago Law School, 1959; currently
a partner at Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Chicago, Illinois.
1. - U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
2. The "aftermarket" includes replacement parts and other products and services related to the
use of the original equipment. Typically, the manufacturer of the equipment not only manufactures
replacement parts but also acts as a wholesaler providing to a dealer organization parts purchased
from other manufacturers, usually from the manufacturers who supply parts for assembling the
original equipment. The dealer organization retails the equipment and is the equipment manufacturers'
choice to do the actual servicing. Situations like Kodak, in which the manufacturer of the equipment
seeks to be the exclusive supplier of maintenance for the equipment appear to be uncommon. See
infra section III.A.4.a.
3. See infra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
4. Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 4 ILL. L. REV. 887, 904 &
n.94 (1988).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1993).
6. Chrysler Motors v. Auto Body Parts of Ohio, 908 F.2d 951, 952 n.l (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(hearing on appeal from denial of preliminary injunction). Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of
plaintiff by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States and on behalf of
defendant by insurance companies, the Consumer Federation of America and by the advocates for
highway auto safety. 155
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designs not only by competitors in the sale of original equipment but also, and
probably more important to OEMs, by firms competing in the aftermarket.
Extensive hearings were held on such legislation in 1987 and 1988. That
legislation was successfully resisted by a coalition of insurers, who are the principal
purchasers of automobile crash parts, consumer groups and independent parts
producers. 7 The effort has not been abandoned. Similar bills were introduced
and additional hearings held in 1990.8 The issue has also arisen in the Uruguay
round of GATT talks in connection with the proposals on industrial design
submitted by the Nordic countries and the European Community. 9 Those pro-
posals would restrict copying replacement part designs and make it more difficult
to resist design protection in the U.S. Congress.' 0
House Bill 1790, introduced in 1991, is an effort to compromise with insurers
and consumer groups. It is a design copyright bill but excludes from its scope
glass for motor vehicles and the elements of a replacement part that "must fit"
in order to attach properly to the equipment." It does not exclude elements of
a part that "must match." The language of the Act would appear still to forbid,
for example, competing suppliers of replacement fenders from copying any part
of the fender other than the parts necessary to attach the fender to the remainder
of the frame. The owner of a car needing a single new fender would have the
"choice" of buying the replacement part from the OEM or driving a car with
unmatched fenders.
This article argues that a combination of the natural advantages of OEMs
over independents 12 in the aftermarket for an OEM's equipment plus the measures
OEMs take to raise the costs of their independent competitors result in replace-
ment parts prices which are already too high. Moreover, while it is undoubtedly
true that original equipment prices are somewhat lower as a result of the higher
aftermarket prices, the net effect is that, except when maintenance or other
aftermarket services are sold as part of a package with the sale of the original
equipment, the price of equipment plus its maintenance is higher when there is
.7. The Industrial Innovation and Technology Act: Hearings on S. 791 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 98 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]; Protection of Industrial Designs of Useful Articles:
Hearings on H.R. 1179 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter 1988 House
Hearings].
8. H.R. 902, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990); H.R. 3499, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990); H.R.
3017, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990). See Industrial Design Protection: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (hearings on H.R. 902, H.R. 3017 and H.R. 3499 dated May 3, 1990,
June 20, 1990 and Sept. 27, 1990, respectively) [hereinafter 1990 House Hearings].
9. Tom Dullforce, EC Proposals Could End U.S. Car Parts Competition, FINANCIAL TwEss,
Sept. 11, 1990, § 1, at 7.
10. Auto Parts Monopoly Costly to Public, NAT'L UNDERWITER, Apr. 2, 1990, at 36.
11. H.R. 1790, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §1002 (1991). Similar protection is under consideration in
Europe. Michael Fawlk, Design Protection in Europe, AIPLA ANTITRUST NEws, June 1992, at 2-3.
12. "Independent" as used herein refers not only to parts suppliers who are not OEMs but also
to an OEM attempting to sell replacement parts for brands other than its own. Independents include
parts manufacturers, some with their own distributor organizations, and a wide variety of wholesalers
and retailers who compete with the OEM and its dealers in the sale of parts and repairs. E.g., Auto
parts departments of chain retailers (Sears, Wal Mart); Auto parts stores (National Auto Parts
Association, "NAPA"); Specialty chains (Genuine Parts Company as a parts supplier to NAPA).
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a monopoly in the aftermarket than when there is competition in both the original
equipment and the aftermarket. If any governmental activity related to replace-
ment parts is desirable, it is action to encourage aftermarket competition; not to
create aftermarket monopolies.
To encourage aftermarket competition this article suggests both new general
legislation and specific modifications and clarifications of antitrust doctrines
designed to make information more readily available to aftermarket competitors
and consumers. In addition, this article recognizes the need to reduce aftermarket
competitors' costs of buying or manufacturing parts and providing repair services.
I. THE NEED FOR AFTERMARKET COMPETITION
It is well accepted that competition, and the marginal cost pricing it en-
courages, is beneficial because it contributes to a more efficient allocation of
resources while protecting consumers from exploitation. However, many argue
that competition in aftermarkets is unnecessary or even undesirable because an
OEM that has an aftermarket monopoly for its own equipment is subject to
restraints on its aftermarket pricing to which monopolists generally are not
subject, and the market may benefit from an OEM aftermarket monopoly. While
these points may be valid, generally the market benefits significantly from
competition in the aftermarket as well as in the original equipment.' 3
A. Aftermarket Competition Should Be Generally Encouraged, Not
Suppressed
Aftermarket prices tend to be monopolistic. They are high in relation to the
marginal cost of providing the parts and services and, at least in the case of
OEM sellers of replacement parts for their own original equipment, profits are
high in relation to the inherent risks of the business. While it is undoubtedly
true that some of the monopolistic aftermarket profit margins must be "given
back" by OEMs through lower prices on the original equipment, many OEMs
will not be required to reduce original equipment prices by the full amount of
the monopolistic prices received in the aftermarket. Moreover, high aftermarket
prices are unnecessary to create incentives to designing parts, and the combination
of competition in the sale of original equipment with a monopoly in the
aftermarket will result in a less efficient allocation of resources than competition
in both markets. It may also decrease competition in the market for the original
equipment.
1. Aftermarket Prices are Monopolistic
OEMs' sales of parts in the automotive aftermarket, perhaps the largest
aftermarket in the United States,' 4 illustrate the high prices of replacement parts.'5
13. I have previously treated the impact of copyright law on parts prices. John J. Voortman,
Copyrighting Parts Books: The Protection of Parts Information as Industriously Collected or Compiled
Data, 10 J.L. & CoM. 219, 246-54 (1991).
14. While the estimates vary, all support the existence of a multibillion dollar market. Thus
retail sales in the United States of auto parts in 1989 were estimated at $95 billion dollars of which
approximately $9 billion were crash parts. Kathleen Heaney, View from Wall Street; Profit seekers
should take interest in auto industry of the 1990's AUTOMOTIVE NEws, Nov. 29, 1989. Sales of
replacement parts alone have been estimated at from $52 billion to $75 billion dollars per year. 1990
19931
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The costs of constructing an automobile from replacement parts, not including
assembly costs, has been estimated to range, at the retail level, from 3 to 8 times
the cost of buying a fully assembled automobile.
16
The profitability of the automotive aftermarket for those parts successfully
monopolized by the OEMs is reflected in the higher prices of OEM parts compared
with the prices of the same parts sold by independents. The dramatic price
reductions on replacement parts when they became subject to aftermarket com-
petition compared to the prices of parts not subject to competition that continued
to increase also bear out the profitability of monopolization. 7 Even when the
OEM is suffering major losses on the original equipment, aftermarket sales can
be profitable.'
While no systematic survey has been taken, the materials found in the process
of preparing this article reflect that not only in the automotive industry but in
many other industries, markets for replacement parts are broadly perceived as
particularly profitable. In the aircraft industry the replacement parts market has
House Hearings, supra note 8, at 304. See also MERRILL LYNCH, AUTOMOTIVE PARTS AND TIRES -
INDUSTRY REPORT, Report No. 943992, (Investext) (Dec. 20, 1989). General Motors' sales of after-
market parts in 1989 were estimated at 8 billion dollars. PRUDENTIAL BACHE, GENERAL MOTORS
COR'ORATION - COMPANY REPORT, Report No. 904411, (Investext) (Jan. 30, 1989). In 1991, spending
on maintenance and repair was estimated at $90 billion for automobiles, $16.4 billion for computers,
$15.6 billion for telecommunications hardware, $5.4 billion of copiers, and $2.1 billion for medical
electronics. Joan E. Rigdon, Small Repair Firms Fight Manufacturers, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1992,
at BI (citing Automotive Services Industry Association, Cannata Report, and D.F. Blumberg &
Associates).
15. Robert Crandall, Vertical Integration and The Market for Repair Parts in the United States
Automobile Industry, 16 J. INDUS. ECON. 212, 226-29 (July 1968). 1990 House Hearings, supra note
8, at 97-99 (statement of Clarence Ditlow on behalf of The Center for Auto Safety and the Consumer
Federation of America) (equivalent non-OEM replacement parts 30% cheaper than OEM replacement
parts). MERRILL LYNCH, VOLVO AB - COMPANY REPORT, Report No. 900789 (Investext) (Jan. 2, 1989);
FITCH INVESTOR SERVICE, TENNECO, INC. - COMPANY REPORT, Report No. 802622 (Investext) (Dec.
1, 1987); DREXEL BURNHsAM LAMBERT, SUBARU OF AMERICA - COMPANY REPORT, Report No. 617062
(Investext) (Nov. 1, 1986). Gail Krueger-Nicholson, The Retailing Climate; Forecast for Independent
Aftermarket Automotive Chains, 15 AUTOMOTIVE MARKETING, Jan. 1986, at 13.
16. Voortman, supra note 13, at 219 n.l; Foreign Aftermarket Parts and the Quality Question,
J. AM. INS., 1987, at 68; Ashcroft Testifies In Favor of Stronger Federal Auto Theft Laws, U.P.I.,
July 19, 1983, Regional News (car theft is profitable because parts can be sold for more than the
price of the car new); Ned Zeman, Auto Insurers Have Victory Over Volvo, NAT'L UNDERWRITERS,
June 13, 1988, at 9. I have not attempted to obtain cost figures for distributing, inventorying and
selling parts in comparison to selling completed cars. I have, however, been unable to find any-
attempt by the automotive OEMs to justify the disparity on the basis of cost. Also, it is not apparent
why it would be more expensive to transport and sell parts than cars. Parts appear less bulky to
transport than completed cars and it is obvious from visits to dealers' parts department and new
cars' showrooms that the facilities devoted to the sale of new cars are plusher than parts departments.
17. See generally, Voortman, supra note 13, at 249 n.126; 1990 House Hearings, supra note 8,
at 281 (statement of Roger S. Lawson); 1990 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 367 (Appendix A to
the Statement of Richard E. Tunney); 1990 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 536 (statement of
James E. Ziegler). Mazda estimated that in response to aftermarket competition it had lowered parts
prices by 25 to 53 percent. Mary Ellen Porcelli, The Clash Over Auto Crash Parts, 88 BESTS' REV.,
PROPERTY-CASUALTY EDITION, June 1987, at 44. General Motors and Ford were reported to have cut
prices on crash parts subject to competition by, respectively, 21 to 28 percent and 34 percent. Arthur
Flax, Foreign Firms Cut Into Domestic Sheet Metal Sales, CRAINS DET. BUS., June 8, 1987, §1 at
19. The Consumer Federation of America has stated that aftermarket competition in crash parts
alone saved consumers $400 million dollars in 1989. Ruth Gastel, Auto Safety, INSURANCE INFOR-
MATION INST., July 1990.
18. Carl Rowan, How GM Made A Bad Year Look Good, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1983, at GI.
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been characterized as "highly profitable" with spare parts sold at almost six
times their original cost.19 OEMs made up for unprofitable prices on planes by
sales of spare parts. 20 As an example, a set of turbine blades of an aircraft engine
reflect a substantial part of the cost of the entire engine. 2' Similarly, the after-
markets for farm machinery22 naval pumps and other naval equipment; 23 trucks;2A
recreational vehicles; 25 pleasure boats; 26 medical machinery; 27 pumps; 28 comput-
ers;29 mining machinery;30 furnaces;3 1 powdered coating equipment; 2 truck trail-
ers;3" oil drilling equipment; 34 off-road vehicles;" engines;3 6 valves; 37 and painting
19. Rogerson Aircraft Corp. v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1494, 1503 (C.D. Cal.
1986). See also Robert L. Parrish, Engine Life Extension: Aircraft Turbine Engine Component Repair
Schemes, Bus. & CoM. AVIATION, May 1988, at 70; John H. Sheridan, A Blow for Competition; A
Recent Ruling Opens Spare-Parts Market, INDUSTRY WK., Jan. 4, 1988, at 20; Joan M. Feldman,
Airframe, Engine Manufacturers Mounting Assault on Costs: Buying and Pricing Aircraft, Part 2,
22 AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Aug. 1985, at 34; Eric J. Lerner, Avionics, Unreliability Turns Fighters
Into Shop Queens, AEROSPACE AM., Aug. 1985, at 68 (replacement parts "sole source" and "a great
money maker - almost pure profit"); DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT, CAPITAL GOODS - INDUSTRY
REPORT, Report No. 941785 (Investext) (Nov. 30, 1989).
20. Feldman, supra note 19.
21. Parrish, supra note 19.
22. U.P.I., June 5, 1986, Regional News (a.m. cycle).
23. A Blow for Competition; Metal Working News, Navy Buying Study, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr.
18, 1983; George C. Wilson, Civilian Got Action Out of Defense Department, A.P., Sept. 3, 1983,
Domestic News Section (OEMs charging greatly inflated prices for replacement parts readily available
from other sources, e.g., $10 for diodes available from federal supply system for 4C or from Radio
Shack for 99C).
24. Lois Therrian, Navistar Tries to Lighten its Load, Bus. WK., Sept. 19, 1988, at 40D.
25. Coast-Distribution: (CR V), the Coast Distribution System Announces Financial Results, Bus.
WK., July 17, 1989.
26. Id.
27. Amal Kumar Naj, G.E. Yields to Tiny Rival in Battle Over Servicing Medical Machines,
WALL ST. J. Mar. 18, 1991, at BI (OEMs "often made little money on equipment sales but relied
instead on service contracts for their profits .... "); Rigdon, supra note 14 (independent's hourly
labor charges are about 25% of OEM's charges).
28. Gould Pumps Reports Tenth Consecutive Increase in Sales and Earnings, PR NEWSWIRE,
Oct. 18, 1989.
29. Mark Halper, Rivals Open $100 Rebates on 64K Home Computers: Say Commodore Readies
16K VIC, 29 ELECTRONIC NEWS, Apr. 18, 1983, at 61.
30. John A. Jones, Harnishfeger Pulls Ahead on Two Leading Business Lines, INVESTORS DAILY,
Feb. 12, 1990, at 34. SHEARSON LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS, INC., HARNISHFEGER INDUSTRIES - COMPANY
REPORT, Report No. 830789, (Investext) (Dec. 19, 1988).
31. International Heater Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 656 (June 29, 1951).
32. SHEARSON LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS, INC., NORDSON CORPORATION -COMPANY REPORT, Report
No. 95247 (Investext) (Feb. 27, 1990); PAINE WEBER, NORDSON CORPORATION - COMPANY REPORT,
Report No. 933864 (Investest) (Oct. 14, 1989).
33. WERTHEIM, SCHRODER, TEREX CORPORATION - COMPANY REPORT, Report No.945650 (Inves-
text) (Jan. 3, 1990).
34. ROBERT W. BARRuErT & Co., INC., BAROW CORtPORATION - COMPANY REPORT, Report
No. 1047200 (Investext) (Dec. 21, 1990).
35. MERRILL LYNCH, CATERPILLAR, INC. - COMPANY REPORT, Report No. 924751 (Investext) (July
27, 1989); DONALDSON LUFKIN & JENRETTE, INC., CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY RESEARCH BULLETIN,
Report No. 400330 (Investext) (Jan. 9, 1984).
36. MORGAN STANELY & CO., INC., IMO INDUSTRIES - COMPANY REPORT, Report No. 916781
(Investext) (May 17, 1989); OPPENHEIMER & CO., INC., TEXTRON, INC. - COMPANY REPORT, Report
No. 616597 (Investext) (Nov. 20, 1986).
37. ALEX. BROWN & SONS, KEYSTONE INTERNATIONAL - COMPANY REPORT, Report No. 616964
(Investext) (Nov. 19, 1986).
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equipment;"8 are generally characterized as "higher margin," "higher profit" or
words of similar import. The foregoing does not purport to be a scientific survey
of aftermarket prices, but the frequent reiteration, in reference to a wide variety
of industries, that replacement parts are high margin products without any
contrary indication is very suggestive of a general rule.
The high margins generally attributed to aftermarkets are also inconsistent
with the theory that aftermarket margins must be high because the business is
unusually risky. The common perception appears to be that aftermarkets are
relatively stable.3 9
2. The Combined Cost of the Original Equipment and its Maintenance. Will
Increase if the Aftermarket is Monopolized
Two broadly applicable arguments challenge the contention that aftermarket
competition is needed to protect buyers from paying monopolistic prices. First,
buyers purchase equipment to perform the function for which it is designed. If
they are rational, they will, in making a decision on which brand of original
equipment to purchase, consider the total cost of performing that function
including the cost of operating the equipment. This will tend to restrain after-
market prices because high maintenance prices will reduce the demand for that
brand. That was the basic argument made by defendant in Kodak and by the
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice which filed an
amicus brief on behalf of the defendant. 40 The dissent by Justice Scalia joined
by Justices O'Connor and Thomas accepted that argument for the most part.4'
Second, even if it is possible to obtain monopolistic aftermarket prices, the
prospects of the monopolistic profit combined with competition in the sale of
original equipment will force original equipment price reductions. Both these
factors should reduce the ability to profit from aftermarket monopoly but not,
I suggest, to the extent of fully eliminating the monopolistic profit.
38. PRUDENTIAL BACHE SECURITIES, GRACO, INC. - COMPANY REPORT, Report No. 708179 (In-
vestext) (May 1, 1987).
39. Auto Parts Suppliers Under Pressure in 1990 Says Analyst, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 3, 1990)
(Duff and Phelps expect replacement parts suppliers to outperform the market because of "more
stable industry fundamentals when compared with other economically sensitive sections."). MERRILL
LYNCH, AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & TirEs - INDUSTRY REPORT, Report No. 943992 (Investext) (Dec. 20,
1989) ("We look for replacement parts stocks to outperform the market during an economic downturn
but to lag during an economic boom."); DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT, INC., SUNDSTRAND CORP. -
COMPANY REPORT, Report No. 932371 (Investext) (Sept. 19, 1989); A Company Reborn, FORBEs, Jan.
9, 1989, at 156; SMITH BARNEY, HARRIS UPHAM & CO., INC., SEALED POWER CORP. - COMPANY
REPORT, Report No. 504734 (lnvestext) (Apr. 26, 1985). But see, DONALDSON LUFKIN & JENRETTE,
INC., THE AUTOMOTIVE MARKET - INDUSTRY REPORT, Report No. 405519 (Investext) (Apr. 10, 1984)
(finding that automotive aftermarket "failed miserably" as a "safe harbor" during the last recession).
40. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2081-82, 2084 n.16. That argument was also raised in the hearings on
the Design Copyright Bill. 1988 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 103-04. It was given by Assistant
Attorney General Baxter as a reason for dropping the tie-in charges against Mercedes Benz of North
America. See Government Would Rather Not Win This Lawsuit, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 23, 1982. See
also, Parts and Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 236 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner,
J. dissenting).
41. Kodak, 112 S.Ct. at 2097.
Aftermarket Monopolization
a. OEMs' Ability to Exploit Aftermarket Monopolies Will Not be Fully
Restrained by Buyer Resistance to Brands with High Maintenance Costs
The impossibility, absent binding contractual provisions, of knowing each
OEM's future aftermarket pricing policies and the cost of obtaining complete
information on even their current pricing policies suggests that buyer consideration
of maintenance costs cannot fully restrain OEM aftermarket pricing. As stressed
by the opinion of the court in Kodak,42 if the threat of the loss of sales of
original equipment is to be a fully effective restraint on aftermarket pricing, it
is essential that buyers have reasonably accurate information about costs of repair
and maintenance of the equipment sold by competing OEMs as well as the
equipment purchased. This will often be expensive, indeed impossible, to obtain.
The critical knowledge is information, at the time of purchasing the original
equipment, concerning the seller's future aftermarket prices. Absent warranty or
other contractual provisions legally restricting the OEM's future pricing policies,
that is information that the buyer cannot have. While the OEM may have a long
history of moderate pricing of replacement parts and/or services, a management
change in ordinary course or as a result of a takeover or a financial emergency
requiring immediate revenue regardless of long term consequences may result in
a decision to increase aftermarket prices as an immediate solution to the problem.
It will often be expensive, and sometimes impossible, to obtain even reason-
ably complete information on current aftermarket pricing policies before making
a decision on the brand of original equipment to purchase. OEMs will not
necessarily provide copies of their parts price lists and pricing policies to anyone
who asks, and even when they do, those will only be the prices of the OEM.
When, as is usually the case, the OEM sells through dealers, they will be free to
charge whatever price they choose when selling parts or making repairs.
While published information, such as that found in Consumer Reports, is
relevant to the cost of maintaining competing brands of automobiles, even that
is much less than the information which would be required to compare the costs
of operating different models over their expected lifetimes. Information as to the
cost, other than energy costs, of maintaining and operating the horde of other
consumer appliances such as refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners,
furnaces, lawn mowers, etc., appears even less available than information on
automobile repair costs.
43
Large purchasers of the equipment in the past may have internal information
on maintenance costs of some brands, but keeping such records also involves
significant administrative expenses. Smaller purchasers will often conclude that
the record keeping or other methods of obtaining information are not worth the
cost since the OEM is free to change its policies in any event.
42. Id. at 2085-87 & n.20.
43. Insurance companies adjust their charges for collision insurance, in part, based on their
estimate of the cost of repairing particular brands of vehicles. Thus, to some extent, the cost of
collision insurance is a surrogate for the cost of replacement parts. Gastel, supra note 17. 1 have
been unable to obtain statistics on the percentage of new car buyers who utilize the relatively easy
device of calling their insurance company prior to making a decision to purchase a new car to
compare the relative costs of collision insurance for the brands under consideration.
1993]
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It is true that the desire to sell the original equipment can serve as a restraint
on aftermarket prices even though some buyers are not well informed of the
OEM's pricing policies. The desire to sell to the buyers who are well informed
will restrain the OEM's prices, but, as the court noted in Kodak,4 only to the
extent that the OEM is not in a position to price discriminate between the two
classes. If, as is frequently the case, the smaller, less well informed buyers or
buyers who have integrated their operations with the unique features of one
brand of equipment can be charged a higher price than the larger, better informed
buyers or buyers who are not tied into a particular brand, then the information
that the larger buyer may have will have little effect on the prices to the sinalier
buyers.4 5 The dissent in Kodak seemed not to disagree with the conclusions of
the majority regarding the effect of aftermarket monopolies on consumers, but
suggested that these effects were normal and unavoidable and should not be the
concern of the antitrust laws."
Because buyers cannot rely on a continuation of favorable aftermarket pricing
policies, even the best informed buyers of the original equipment must discount
the benefits of such policies to reflect the fact that the benefits may never occur.
The costs, and sometimes impossibility, of obtaining information on even current
maintenance costs of equipment will also result in buyers being less than com-
pletely sensitive to future parts and servicing costs when buying original equip-
ment. Because rational buyers will discount the benefits of future maintenance
cost savings, firms with aftermarket pricing policies who are competing with
firms with lower aftermarket pricing policies will not be forced, by buyers'
concerns with maintenance costs, to lower their original equipment prices by the
full amount of the added profit in the aftermarket. Therefore, it will be in the
interest of OEMs and their dealers to charge what the market will bear in the
aftermarket and price their original equipment accordingly.
b. Competition in Original Equipment Will not Lower Original
Equipment Prices by the Full Amount of the Monopolistic Aftermarket Prices
Competition from other OEMs will also tend to force lower original equip-
ment prices to compensate for monopolistic aftermarket prices. When each unit
of original equipment sold will predictably result in additional aftermarket sales
at a monopolistic profit, OEMs will reduce profits on original equipment or
possibly even sell at a loss to increase aftermarket sales. 47 OEM's will not be
44. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
45. The opinion of the court in Kodak relied on these factors to conclude that the servicing
monopoly which Kodak sought to achieve could have negative effects on customers. It should be
noted that the Robinson-Patman Act's restrictions on price discrimination will generally not be
applicable to protect the less sophisticated buyers or those who have made a commitment to a
particular brand. This is so because they will usually not be competitors, and the Act's protection
against injury to buyers (commonly referred to as secondary line injury) is applicable only to
discrimination between competitors. See infra section III A.1.f.
46. Id. at 2096-99.
47. Parrish, supra note 19; Dexter Hutchins, Caterpillar's Triple Whammy, TIME, Oct. 27, 1986,
at 91 (to protect replacement parts business Caterpillar has always been willing to cut original
equipment prices and lock in the replacement customer). See Allan Zelenitz, Below - Cost Original
Equipment Sales as a Promotional Means, REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. Nov. 1977, at 438, 446. Allan
Zelenitz, .The Attempted Promotion of Competition in Related Goods Markets, ANTITRUST BULL.,
Spring 1980, at 103, 113-14 [hereinafter Zelenitz 1980] (independent sparkplug manufacturers' sales
to automobile OEMs at below cost treated as promotional expense because the use of a brand of
plug in original equipment was essential to success in the plug aftermarket).
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equally able to utilize that strategy because they will not be equally able to
employ the various devices for monopolizing the aftermarket that are described
in this article.4 The original equipment prices of OEMs that are less able to do
so will not force down the original equipment prices of competitors more
successful at monopolizing the aftermarket by the full amount of the monopolistic
aftermarket prices.
The analysis in subsections a. and b. above, suggests that in an industry in
which it is possible to monopolize all or a part of the aftermarket, aftermarket
prices will be monopolistic, but that competitive pressure will require OEMs to
reduce original equipment prices. Aftermarket prices will be high and original
equipment prices low in relation to marginal costs. While not all firms with
monopolistic aftermarket prices are able to charge monopolistic prices for the
combination of original equipment and aftermarket parts or services, that will
be the case for those firms, generally the larger firms, that are most able to
monopolize the aftermarket.
3. An OEM or Dealer May Raise Parts Prices in the Process of Going Out of
Business
The restraining effect of original equipment competition on both original
equipment and aftermarket prices that tends to limit the harm which aftermarket
monopolies would otherwise do is absent when an OEM concludes that there is
neither a long run future for its brand nor the likelihood of selling out as a
going business. The OEM has little further incentive to refrain from charging
whatever the traffic will bear in the aftermarket.
More frequently, though on a smaller scale, the same will be true of the
OEM's dealers. An OEM with numerous dealers will, on a continuing basis,
have some who want to leave the business to retire or for other reasons. Selling
the dealership will not always be the way to obtain the highest recovery for the
business. For example, the dealership's good will may be principally the good
will of the owner as an individual and not effectively transferrable to someone
else with the sale. The owner, particularly if the dealership has substantial
protection from intrabrand competition, may believe that the best way to take
money out of the dealership is to increase margins on original equipment, parts
and service and accept the resulting decline in market share. That conflicts with
the OEM's interest, but there are limits on the OEM's ability to protect itself.
Maximum price fixing by the OEM would constitute a violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act under the Rule of Albrecht v. The Herald Company49 and
replacing the dealer may be difficult. Contractual protections of the dealer,
statutory provisions, and concern about lawsuits for alleged antitrust violations
may make pruning dealership organizations risky and expensive. Finally, satis-
factory new dealers may be difficult to find. That is particularly true if the old
dealer is not terminated because it is then impossible to offer the new dealer any
territorial protection.
48. For example, some firms will use more unique parts, which are more often successfully
monopolized than standard parts.
49. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).




4. Artificially High Parts Prices Result in Waste
When maintenance costs are artificially high, equipment will be junked before
the end of what its useful life would be if both maintenance and original
equipment were priced at marginal cost. Competitive or lower than competitive
prices for the original equipment combined with monopolistic aftermarket prices
increase the probability that the equipment will be junked prematurely.
5. Purchasing Decisions Will be Less Well Informed
One of the consequences of artificially low original equipment prices com-
bined with monopolistic aftermarket prices is to shift part of the total cost of
using the equipment from the price of the equipment, a price that is known
when the equipment is purchased, to the future. That makes it more difficult
not only for the buyer to compare competing brands, but also to determine
whether it is economical to invest in equipment of that kind. One who buys
under the assumption of competitive aftermarket pricing will be misled by the
artificially low initial price of the original equipment as to the total cost of using
it over its lifetime. The purchase may not be economically justified when the
total cost is considered. This is particularly likely when the buyer has some
general knowledge of maintenance costs for that type of equipment sold at
competitive prices, but is unaware of the extent of the monopoly in the after-
market for a specific OEM's brand of equipment. That is much less likely when
the existence of the OEM's future aftermarket monopoly is disclosed, for example,
by the fact that the buyer made an express agreement to purchase replacement
parts or services from the OEM.
6. Entry Into the Market for the Original Equipment Will be More Costly
Entry into a market in which low original equipment prices are subsidized
by high aftermarket prices will be more costly than if prices in both markets are
competitive. The cost of entry into the business of selling original equipment and
parts or complete maintenance will be increased because the new entrant must
wait for a return on investment until sufficient time after sale of the original
equipment for the original equipment to wear out and become a substantial
market for repairs. Assuming, as is commonly believed, that increasing the size
of the investment required tends to make entry more difficult, the effect of an
aftermarket monopoly will be to restrict entry."
7. Buyers May be Injured by Monopolistic Prices Even if the OEM is Making
a Business Mistake
Even if it were conceded that monopolistic aftermarket prices are always a
mistake in the long run, sellers will make mistakes. Moreover, firms probably
have a bias in favor of taking profits now and taking their chances with the
future. That is particularly likely when a firm is in financial difficulty. A firm's
decision to take some quick profits by raising aftermarket prices will injure
existing owners even if it turns out to be an unprofitable tactic in the long run.
51. The assumption that higher capital requirements delay entry has been questioned. George J.
Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 23, 27 (May 1950).
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The expectations of buyers who based their purchasing decisions on cost projec-
tions assuming competitive aftermarket prices will find their expectations frus-
trated.
8. Aftermarket Monopoly is Not Necessary to Spur Design Creativity
The OEM may have spent substantial resources deciding on the specifications
and design of the equipment and the parts of the equipment, particularly the
unique parts. It is entitled to a reward for its commercially successful design
work. Without the prospect of a reward, the company would have less incentive
to spend resources on design. The grant of a monopoly by law would provide
the incentive. However, this gives limited, if any, support to giving OEMs
monopoly rights, vis a vis aftermarket competitors.
The design of parts is largely dictated by the performance and appearance
desired for the original equipment and the need to mesh with other components
of that equipment and not by any separate consideration of the superior ap-
pearance or performance of the parts standing alone. This is obviously true, for
example, of crash parts for automobiles and probably for a great majority of
the structural aspects of the design of parts. The parts are not inherently superior
to any other part except for use in the particular brand of original equipment
for which they are designed because they are designed to work together with the
other components. No persuasive reason exists to treat such designs as a property
right of the OEM.
Where the OEM creates a unique design of a part that is superior, standing
alone, a justification exists for a monopolistic price and for protection against
competition from copies. Admittedly patent protection will not always provide
such protection. However, parts are designed principally to create the original
equipment and, if the OEM is protected against copying the superior design for
competing original equipment, lack of protection against copying by aftermarket
competitors is, at most, a minor threat to the incentive for creating such designs.
Further, just as OEMs' pricing of replacement parts is partially restrained by the
fact that sophisticated buyers will pay less for the brands that have a reputation
for requiring high cost maintenance and repair, to at least the same extent,
reduction in maintenance costs resulting from lower replacement parts prices will
permit a higher price for the original equipment. That should occur regardless
of whether the economical repair is made with parts provided by the OEM or
by its aftermarket competitors.
B. Benefits of Aftermarket Monopolies
While aftermarket monopolies should generally be avoided there are circum-
stances in which they may contribute to economic efficiency and be beneficial to
consumers.
1. An Aftermarket Monopoly May Permit Efficiency Enhancing "Metering"
when the OEM also has Monopoly Power in the Market for the Original
Equipment
"Metering" as used herein refers to a method of determining the amount
the equipment is used for purposes of charging according to use. It is employed,
for example, when equipment is leased at rates based on its usage. Some buyers
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will find a product more attractive and necessary than others and, therefore, be
willing to pay a higher price. Sellers, if able, would benefit from charging each
buyer the highest price that that buyer would be willing to pay for the product
as long as the price is in excess of the seller's marginal cost. In a competitive
market such pricing is impossible. Even monopolists will usually find it difficult
to charge buyers widely varying prices because of arbitrage - the buyer paying
the lower price would resell to the buyer being charged the higher price forcing
the price down toward the lower price. The difference between the seller's actual
price and the higher price some buyers would be willing to pay is sometimes
referred to as "consumer surplus."
If, as is often the case, the amount buyers are willing to pay in order to
obtain the use of the equipment depends on the amount they will use the
equipment, then the seller with an original equipment monopoly may be able to
avoid arbitrage and increase its profits by retaining ownership of the equipment,
leasing it and charging a rental based on use. Leasing and directly metering use,
however, will usually involve substantial costs of equipment and administration.
It will also increase the OEM's capital requirements because the OEM is receiving
no immediate return of capital at the time of the lease but must await a return
by the payment of rent over time. In addition, typically lessees will not maintain
and handle leased equipment as carefully as equipment they own with the result
that the leased equipment will require more maintenance and repair. When the
OEM has an aftermarket monopoly and the need for maintenance tends to
increase with the amount it is used, taking a monopoly profit in the aftermarket
can serve as a surrogate for direct methods of charging for use, without all the
disadvantages of leasing.
The metering made possible when an OEM has a monopoly of the aftermarket
may have net positive effects when the OEM also has a monopoly of the original
equipment. Profit maximization by the monopolist selling to everyone at the
same price will result in prices above marginal costs and correspondingly lower
production levels than under competition. The monopolist that can discriminate
based on the price each purchaser is willing to pay will sell to even those buyers
willing to pay only the sellers marginal cost. Price discrimination will tend to
increase production towards the competitive level.
There are losers under this kind of price discrimination - the buyers who
would still have had some consumer surplus when purchasing at the uniform
monopoly price. There are also winners. They are the monopolist, to whom the
surplus is diverted, plus the buyers who purchase at the discriminatory lower
price, but would not have done so at the uniform monopolistic price.12 Putting
aside the probably higher cost of administering the discriminatory pricing structure
52. See Tyler A. Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordion
Knot, 66 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1257-74, 1276-81 (1980). In Jefferson Parrish Hospital v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 10 (1984), the majority opinion viewed the "discrimination" permitted by charging according
to use negatively as it "can increase the social cost of market power." Id. at 14. In contrast, the
four justice minority opinion advocated the abandonment of the per se rule for tying arrangement
arguing, as suggested here, that price discrimination may decrease the economic cost of market power.
Id. at 36-37, 41. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Kodak seems to recognize, without
necessarily agreeing with, the fact that the court has treated a monopolist's ability to discriminate in
price as a negative rather than, as here, a positive factor. Kodak, 112 S.Ct. at 2095.
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there is a net gain. The gain to the monopolist would equal the loss of the
consumer surplus to the buyers who would have bought at a uniform monopoly
price. The benefit to the buyers who are enabled to purchase only because of
the discrimination resulting from the ability to meter, plus the monopolist's gain
on those sales, is a net gain.
5 3
Metering, and charging according to use, may also serve as a risk allocation
device. Potential buyers, particularly for new products, may be uncertain not
only about the quality of the new product but also about the utility of the
product in their operations - will they be able to use it enough to justify the
investment. By reducing the price of the original equipment and obtaining instead
a higher price for its use by the buyers, the OEM absorbs part of the risk.
54
Therefore, an aftermarket monopoly may be an administratively economical way
of accomplishing efficiency enhancing metering."
2. OEM Aftermarket Monopolies may Facilitate Quality Control and New
Entry into the Market for the Equipment
When repairs are made under the seller's warranty, the seller will normally
insist on the use of its parts and on doing the warranty work or having it done
by its dealers. 56 The Seller is "paying" for the repair and, to minimize its future
warranty expense, it will wish to be certain of the quality of the repairs.
Setting specifications for replacement parts to be used for warranty repairs
may be a practical alternative method to insuring parts qualify in some instances.5
7
However, it is apparent that administering such a program and policing compli-
ance will involve substantial costs. The costs may well increase the price of the
repairs to consumers by an amount greater than the increase resulting from an
OEM monopoly.
The OEM's concern with the quality of repairs on its equipment is not
limited to repairs made during the warranty period. Repairs with inferior parts
can result in failures that the owner may attribute to the equipment itself rather
than to the parts used in the repair. The damage done to the reputation and
salability of the original equipment is particularly likely to be serious when the
equipment is novel and untested or the OEM is attempting to break into a market
against already established firms. Under such circumstances, permitting the OEM
to monopolize the aftermarket, at least for a period, may facilitate entry into
the original equipment market and thus increase competition.5"
53. See generally Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLum. L. Rav.
1121, 1126-35 (1983). Sidak argues that technological tie-ins - changing the design of equipment so
that only the OEM will be able to provide parts - contributes to economic efficiency. His article
was written in response to Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981). See also, Janusz A. Ordover et
al., Predatory Systems Rivalry: A Reply, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (1983).
54. See Sidak, supra note 53, at 1135; M.L. Burstein, A Theory of Full Line Forcing, 55 Nw.
U. L. REv. 62 (1960-61).
55. See Sidak, supra note 53, at 1137-40.
56. Such insistence is sometimes illegal. See infra note 68.
57. The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7522, 7541 (1983 & Supp. 1992) in
effect required OEMs to certify the quality of competitors' emission control parts rather than the
use of OEM parts.
58. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2094 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 514 n.9 (1969) (White, J. dissenting); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,




It is apparent from the discussion in subsections 1 and 2 above that neither
general encouragement nor categorical condemnation of all aftermarket monop-
olies is appropriate. A case by case approach is required. It is necessary to weigh
not only the advantages and disadvantages of a monopoly of a particular
aftermarket, but if the monopoly is considered undesirable, to consider the costs
as well as the benefits of prohibiting the conduct that leads the OEM to obtain
monopolistic profits.
II. THE SOURCES OF OEMS' POWER TO OBTAIN MONOPOLISTIC
AFTERMARKET PROFITS
Because buyers' preferences for OEM parts and services and lower OEM
costs, competition from independents will rarely force aftermarket prices to the
OEM's marginal cost. Underlying those factors is the cost of obtaining parts
information and the OEM's higher volume, particularly for parts.
A. Buyer's Preference for OEM Parts and Servicing
Price and availability being equal, consumers will normally prefer parts
provided by or under the auspices of the OEM.5 9 Parts used by OEMs in
producing original equipment often become more saleable even for purposes of
repairing other brands of original equipment. 60 In the case of sparkplugs, for
example, use by an OEM has been so essential to sales of plugs in the aftermarket
that plug manufacturers sold to OEMs at far below cost in the expectation of
recovering the losses in the aftermarket.
61
Lack of information and the expense, in money and inconvenience, of
obtaining information about the relative quality of competing parts and services
lies at the root of this preference. 62 Individual consumers probably do not even
know the identity of most of the manufacturers of the parts used to repair their
equipment, much less are they in a position to test the quality of the parts before
they are purchased.
Firms with in-house capacity for repair and maintenance work and individual
do-it-yourselfers will be aware of the brand used at least for the maintenance
which they perform in-house. However, that will rarely include all parts. Even
as to the parts used for in-house repairs, where the brand of the part is known,
some or all of the specifications may be unavailable. 63 The equipment users will
rarely have the kind of equipment necessary to determine all the parts specifi-
cations or otherwise establish their quality prior to purchasing and using the
parts. That is even more true of parts purchased by individual consumers. Even
when parts specifications are readily available, examining and comparing the
specifications of a multitude of parts for numerous brands by personnel with the
required skills will be costly.
59. Tibor Scitovsky, Capitalism and Monopolistic Competition: The Theory of Oligopoly;
Ignorance as a Source of Oligopoly Power, 40 AM. ECON. Rav. 48 (May 1950).
60. Johnson Brauns Company v. Commissioner, 24 TCM 1542 (1965).
61. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 450 U.S. 562 (1972); Harry L. Hanson & Marcell N.
Smith, Champion Case: What is Competition?, 29 HARv. Bus. REv. 89 (1951).
62. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. PoL. ECON. 213 (1961).
63. Manufacturers may refuse to make the specifications of their parts available. Senate Hearings,
supra note 8, at 133 (statement of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners); 1988 House
Hearings, supra note 8, at 192 (testimony of William S. Thompson).
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The logical solution to the owner's problem of lack of objective information
will often be to take the repair business to the OEM's dealers or, if to an
independent repair facility, to insist on the use of the OEM's parts. The owner
knows of the OEM and has felt sufficiently confident in its reputation to buy
the equipment. In contrast, all the owner may know about independent parts
suppliers is what appears in the OEM's advertisements for "genuine" OEM parts
and horror stories about the consequences of buying cheap parts from fly-by-
nights. At least the OEM parts presumably will have been designed or selected
to mesh with the other components of the original equipment. The owner cannot
be confident that that is true of competing parts which are produced by firms
seeking to sell parts for a variety of brands. The OEM, moreover, will have
greater incentive to use quality parts than an independent parts supplier. It has
an established business in both the original equipment and aftermarket to protect
against the damage to its goodwill that would result from problems created by
substandard parts.
In addition, aftermarket demand is probably not very price sensitive. First,
replacement parts sold to the ultimate consumer as part of a repair job will often
be so urgent as to prevent the owners from spending significant time shopping
for the most competitive supplier.6 Second, with the high cost of downtime,
deterioration of the equipment and even possible personal injuries resulting from
an inferior or improper repair, a slight increase in the odds favoring high quality
and speed of repair work will justify large price increases. When the consequences
of the use of substandard parts are combined with the logical reasons for assuming
that OEM parts will be more reliable and combined with the common philosophy
of "you get what you pay for",61 it is not surprising that aftermarkets typically
provide monopolistic profits, particularly to OEMs.
B. Higher Costs of Independent Aftermarket Competitors
Independents will often have higher cost than the OEMs because their volume
of sales will not support the same economies of scale as the OEM and because
of the lack of critically needed information or the cost and expense of obtaining
such information.
1. Higher OEM Volume
Firms producing solely for the aftermarket will tend to have smaller require-
ments for parts than OEMs. 6 There are a number of reasons for this including
those discussed above in Part IIA. Even if that were not the case, however,
aftermarket competitors would still tend to have smaller requirements than the
OEM because the OEM buys or manufactures both for original equipment and
64. It seems likely that equipment owners do relatively little price shopping after the equipment
has broken down. Jay Bock & Jack Creamer, The Future of Distribution ... is Likely to be Much
More Disciplined!, MOTOR AGE, Dec. 1989, at 28. They will often, however, have past experiences
with repair facilities that will assist them in making a selection of servicing organizations.
65. John Wirebach, Shelf Strategy Case Studies In Using Packaging and Pricing As Key Elements
In Shelf Strategy, AUToMoTvE MARKETING, Feb. 1968, at 27 (Private label parts must be sold below
national brand prices with enough of a discount to "upset traditional buying habits . . . [but] if the
gap gets too large, you might make the consumer believe the product must be worthless.").
66. Firms manufacturing standardized parts used in a number of different products or brands
of equipment will generally have larger volume than any single OEM.
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the aftermarket as well as for repairs under warranty. 67 The larger volume will
frequently permit lower production costs because of economies of scale. For
some parts of almost every product, the combination of low replacement volume
plus economies of scale will provide the OEM with a complete monopoly of
parts that rarely need replacement. The higher volume will also often result in
lower acquisition costs for parts purchased by the OEM.
Economies of scale and opportunities for the OEM to obtain monopolistic
profits for parts unique to its equipment arise when per unit costs continue to
decline at production levels higher than a firm selling solely in the aftermarket
can expect to attain.6 Aftermarket competitors, actual or potential, will be unable
to sell at prices which would force OEM prices to marginal cost. if the cost
differences are sufficient, the OEM or its supplier will have a natural monopoly
in such parts.
Even if the OEM buys instead of manufactures the part, it can obtain the
lower price due to its supplier's lower per unit cost. The OEM, by its selection
of suppliers, selects the firm that will attain the lower production cost. The lower
production cost is then reflected in its lower prices. 69 However, while that will
benefit the OEM in its competition with other OEMs, it will not benefit the
OEM in its competition with aftermarket competitors if its supplier sells to those
competitors at the same price as to the OEM.
Even when the higher volume does not produce lower cost for the supplier,
the supplier may be willing to give a large buyer a lower price than a smaller
buyer or forego selling to the small buyer in order to keep the business of the
larger buyer.7 0
Moreover because of the OEM's complete natural monopoly over the sale
of some parts, wholesale or retail, competitors will have to buy the part from
the OEM or its dealers. If the part is unavailable to competing repair services
they will be unable to make needed repairs and will have to turn the job over
to the OEM's dealers. Needless to say, if the OEM's dealers sell to competitors
at all, they are unlikely to provide them with large discounts below retail price.
67. It is not clear whether the OEM may require that warranty repairs be made with OEM
parts. Such a requirement as applied to anti-pollution equipment was prohibited under the 1977
amendments to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7541 (1992). Even if not required, however, consumer
preference for OEM parts combined with the fact that their cost is covered by the warranty will
make it very difficult for independent aftermarket competitors to get much of the parts and servicing
business provided under the warranty.
68. However, if per unit costs also continue to decline at production levels higher than the
OEM's requirements, the OEM will obtain the lowest cost by contracting for the manufacture of the
part by a third party also manufacturing parts for others. When the part is a standardized part
widely used in other products, economies of scale, without more, are unlikely to contribute to supra
competitive pricing by OEMs. In most cases the total demand for the part will be sufficient to
support production at the most economic level by a number of firms. If not, and economies of scale
are so great that they favor a level of production sufficient to support only one supplier for the
parts used by all OEMs and others at the most economic production level, it will be that supplier,
and not an individual OEM, that will be in a position to exploit any resulting economies of scale.
69. This is reflected by the fact that, in contrast to aftermarket margins, supplying parts to
OEMs for original equipment "historically has been a low-margin low-return - on - equity - business."
Kathleen Heaney, View From Wall Street; Profit Seekers Should take Interest in Auto Industry of
1990's, AUTOMOTVE NEWS, Nov. 29, 1989, at 184.
70. Components sold to OEMs for original equipment are likely to carry a lower price than the
same components sold in the aftermarket. Zelenitz 1980, supra note 47, at 113-14.
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2. Independent Competitors' Lack of Information
The cost of obtaining information is a factor not only in creating consumer
willingness to pay more for OEM parts and services, but also a factor increasing
costs for the OEM's aftermarket competitors. Current and relatively complete
knowledge of the identity of the OEM's suppliers, the specifications and inter-
changeability of the parts of the original equipment and the OEM's prices is
needed to produce or acquire the parts economically and to market them
effectively.
The identity of the supplier to the OEM is important because as the
manufacturer of the part for the original equipment it is often the highest volume
and most efficient producer. Also, independents can counteract, at least partially,
the preference for OEM parts if they can advertise that their parts are made by
the supplier to the OEM. They cannot do either if they cannot identify the
supplier of the part to the OEM.
Aftermarket competitors need the plans and specifications of the parts they
will manufacture, have manufactured for them or use in the servicing of equip-
ment. A part must be able to fulfill its function subject to the operating,
temperature, pressure, chemical and other conditions to which it will be exposed
when operating as a part of the equipment. The OEM, in the process of designing
the equipment, will presumably have done any testing necessary to ensure the
part's performance. If this information is available to aftermarket competitors
only by redesigning the part by reverse engineering it will obviously be expensive.
Lack of knowledge of the OEM's parts specifications may also prevent the
aftermarket competitor from countering the general preference for OEM parts
by advertising that the parts equal or exceed the OEM's specifications. Parts
interchangeability information is also often essential. 71 This interchangeability is
normally accomplished in the form of a part number. The OEM assigns a
different number to each non identical part and, in its parts manuals, lists the
part number of each of the parts used in each of its models. The part number
informs the person making the repair which of the variety of parts generally
serving the same function and having the same common name should be used
to repair a specific piece of equipment identified by year, model or serial number.
While that information can sometimes be obtained by the firm making the repair
by looking at the part being replaced, that is not always true because the
differences may not be apparent by simple observation. Manufacturing and
wholesaling firms also require information on interchangeability to make the
decisions on what parts to manufacture or stock, because the potential sales
volume of the part will be greatly influenced by the number and popularity of
the models in which the part is used.
Because of customer preferences for original equipment parts, aftermarket
competitors must typically price their parts no higher than the OEM parts and
often the price must be substantially lower. 72 The OEM's price is, therefore, an
important factor in the decision of an aftermarket manufacturer or wholesaler
in deciding on whether to manufacture or stock a part. It is also a common
71. See generally, Voortman, supra note 13, at 240-43.
72. See supra Section 11A.
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strategy for aftermarket competitors to advertise their parts as cheaper than OEM
prices. When current OEMs' price lists are not readily available considerable time
and expense may be required to shop the dealers for their prices and obtaining
wholesale prices may be impossible.
III. PROPOSALS
It is probably impossible to eliminate monopolistic aftermarket prices without
draconian legislation such as price controls or utility type regulation. Both would
undoubtedly do much more harm than good. As a first step to encourage
aftermarket competition, however, Congress and the courts can avoid making
matters worse. They can avoid enacting legislation like the Design Copyright Bill
in its present form. In addition, I propose modifications and clarifications of the
antitrust and copyright laws and legislation generally requiring disclosure of parts
information.
Two premises underlie these proposals. First, an OEM that designs equipment
with a combination of parts that accomplishes the purposes of the equipment
more efficiently and reliably than competing equipment should be rewarded for
the effort whether or not the design of the equipment or any of its components
is patentable. Second, selling the equipment should be treated, at least absent an
agreement to the contrary, as including a right for the buyer to use or have
others use, for it, the design and information embodied in the components of
the equipment." Though there are situations, such as described in Section IB in
which aftermarket monopolies promote economic efficiency and should be al-
lowed, for the reasons stated in Section IA, generally the reward for a better
design of equipment should be in the form of a greater profit on the sale or
lease of the equipment and not in the form of monopolistic profit on the
maintenance of the equipment.
A. Modifications and Clarifications of the Antitrust Laws
OEMs commonly employ a wide variety of practices to entrench their
positions by making information more costly to obtain and by preventing after-
market competitors from participating in economies of scale. This section discusses
those practices and the extent to which they are subject to attack under the
antitrust laws. This Section also proposes modifications and clarifications to make
the antitrust laws more effective in protecting competition in aftermarkets. It
also suggests that some present interpretations of those laws are generating
litigation which has no benefit to the public or may even be increasing the cost
of aftermarket parts and services. A number of the suggestions made here would
be moot if the legislation proposed in section IIIB and C were enacted.
The antitrust laws, particularly Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,7 4 are
presently the chief legal basis for attacking practices resulting in monopolistic
prices. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations and
73. This was the rationale of the House of Lords in British Leyland Motor Corp. v. Armstong
Patent Co., [1986] 1 App. 577 (F.S.R. 591). See Claude Barfield & Cynthia Beltz, Industrial Design
Protection and Automobile Repair Parts: Balancing Competition and Monopoly at Home and Abroad,
AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 117-22 (1990).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1992).
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conspiracies ("agreements") in restraint of trade. Recognizing that all contracts
have some restraining effect on the parties, the Act has long been construed to
prohibit only "unreasonable restraints."" The reasonableness of a restraint is
generally tested by whether the agreement, on balance, is pro-competitive or anti-
competitive. A restraint may be pro-competitive, on balance, because it increases
efficiency or because, as in the case of patents, the restraint provides a necessary
incentive to desired activity. The effect of a practice or competition is weighed
in the context of a "relevant market." The definition of the relevant market is
the often critical first step because it determines market share and market share
is often the most important part of the analysis of effect on competition.
Where the issue is the relevant market for aftermarket parts or service there
are several possible relevant markets depending on the circumstances. Thus, each
separate non-interchangeable part may be a relevant market or parts for each
brand of equipment may be separate relevant markets, as opposed to parts for
all competing brands. The principle relevant market issue for purposes of the
article, however, is whether aftermarket parts or services are a separate market
from the market for the original equipment or part of a market that includes
the original equipment and everything necessary to maintain and use the original
equipment. The latter view depends on the theory that buyers are interested in
the cost over time of performing the function for which the equipment is intended
and is related to the argument, discussed above, that if the OEM raises aftermarket
prices it will be forced to reduce original equipment prices correspondingly. That
view was decisively rejected in Kodak and it is now clear that aftermarkets can
be and often should be treated legally as relevant markets separate from the
original equipment.
76
Some kinds of agreements are "per se" unreasonable. That is, they are
treated as unreasonable without any investigation of the overall economic effect
of the agreement. Price fixing agreements, agreements between competitors to
allocate customers or territories and agreements between competitors to boycott
a supplier or customer are examples of "per se" illegal agreements.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempts to mo-
nopolize and conspiracies to monopolize. 77 To show "monopolization" a plaintiff
must prove "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the willful acquisition, maintenance or use of that power by anti-competitive
or exclusionary means or for anti-competitive or exclusionary purposes. ' 78 Mo-
nopoly power has been defined as "the power to raise prices without losing so
much business that the price increase is unprofitable. '79
75. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-61 (1910).
76. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2080.
77. A conspiracy to monopolize would also, presumably, be a conspiracy in restraint of trade
and it is not apparent that the conspiracy provision of Section 2 prohibits anything not already
prohibited by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
78. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2089; Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation,
472 U.S. 585, 595 (1985). See also, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966);
T.V. Communications Network, Inc. v. ESPN, Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,476, 66,016 (8th
Cir. 1991).
79. Olympia Equipment Leasing v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 797 F.2d 370, 373 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).
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The presence or absence of monopoly power is often inferred from market
share, but the percentage of the market that may support such an inference is
often unclear.8 0 In United States v. Alcoa"' Judge Hand stated that 90%0 was
enough, 33% was not enough and that it was "doubtful" that 60%-640o was
enough. More recent cases have held that 160,12 20-25083 and 32-350/084 were
not enough. In Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline,5 the court
suggested that while the Supreme Court had "refused to specify a minimum
market share ... lower courts generally require a minimum market share of
between 7000 and 80%." It is clear, however, that factors other than market
share are relevant to determining the existence of a "monopoly." 8 6
Attempted monopolization is established by proof of specific intent to control
prices or destroy competitors by improper means, predatory or anti-competitive
conduct directed toward that goal and a dangerous probability of success. 7 The
distinctions between Sections 1 and 2 are, therefore, that Section 1 requires some
degree of collaboration, joint action, or at least, adherence (hereinafter "agree-
ment") by two or more parties. 8 That is not a requirement under Section 2, but
Section 2 requires proof of actual or probable monopolization - a greater anti-
competitive effect than is required under Section 1, particularly in Section 1 per
se cases. Firms acting "unilaterally" have much greater freedom of action than
firms acting together. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9 Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 90 Section 3 of the Clayton Act 91 and Section 2(a) of the
Clayton Act as amended by the Act commonly known as the Robinson-Patman
Act 92 may also be applicable to some of the practices.
1. Denying Aftermarket Competitors Equal Access to the Most Efficient
Suppliers
The larger volume of the OEM 93 or its supplier will frequently result in
economies of scale and lower per unit costs. When the market for a part, usually
a part unique to a single brand of original equipment, is sufficiently small in
relation to the economies of scale in its production, no one other than the
manufacturer of the part for original equipment will be able to manufacture and
80. See generally, Continental Trend Resources Inc. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,510, 66239-66240 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
81. 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
82. Barry v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1986).
83. C.E. Serv., Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985).
84. Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 261 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).
85. 885 F.2d 683, 694 n.18 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 441 (1990).
86. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 968 (10th Cir. 1990); Shopping Bag v.
Dillon Cos., 783 F.2d 159, 162 (10th Cir. 1986).
87. Abcor Corp. v. Am. Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1990); City of Vernon v. So.
Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1992).
88. A corporation, its subsidiaries and affiliated companies and their officers and employees are
a single party for purposes of this rule. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752 (1984) (overturning earlier, inconsistent precedents).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1992).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1992).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1992).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1992).
93. See supra Section IIBI.
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sell the part at a competitive price. The OEM or its supplier will have a natural
monopoly on the sale of the part. If the part is manufactured by the OEM or
an outside supplier that resells only to the OEM, the part will generally be
available only from the OEM'S dealers.
While demand for any single one of these "natural monopoly" parts will
be small, the number of repair jobs that require one or more of such parts may
be substantial. Competitive dealers and other repair facilities will regularly need
some of these parts to repair the equipment and will be under a serious competitive
handicap if forced to turn over to the OEM or its dealers all repair jobs which
require the use of any such part.
The OEM whose strategy is to take its profit in the aftermarket has an
obvious interest in denying aftermarket competitors access to its supplier. It is
relatively easy and risk free for the OEM to do so when it manufactures the
component itself, but more difficult when the part is manufactured for the OEM
by another firm.
a. Refusal to Sell to Aftermarket Competitors
If the OEM does nothing more than refuse to provide products, information
or services to a competitor, the competitor's options under existing law are limited
principally to doctrines developed under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. While
firms, including monopolists, are generally free to choose the parties with whom
they deal, there are some limitations. Thus, a refusal to deal by a monopolist in
an attempt to exclude competition without a legitimate business reason violates
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.94 Moreover, under the similar "essential facility"
or "bottleneck" rules a firm with a monopoly of a facility essential to its
competitors' operations may be required under some circumstances to provide
the facility to the competitors. 95 To utilize that rule, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
control of an essential facility by a monopolist of the facility; (2) inability of a
competitor of the firm controlling the facility to practically or reasonably duplicate
the facility; (3) the denial of the facility to the competitor; and (4) that it is
feasible for the owner to provide the facility to the competitor.9 The feasibility
test has been construed as requiring the plaintiff to prove that the owner of the
essential facility had no "legitimate business or technical reason" for denying
the facility to the competitor. 97
Two major problems face an aftermarket supplier that seeks to use the
essential facility rule to require an OEM to provide it with parts or information.
94. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 602-05; Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Delaware
& Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct 2041
(1991).
95. Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. at 366 (1973); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S.
383, 405, 409 (1912).
96. Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 544 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 64 (1991); Delaware and Hudson Ry. Co., 902 F.2d at 179; MCI Communications v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-1137 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
97. Illinois ex rel Burris v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1482-83 (7th Cir.
1991); Laurel Sand and Gravel, 924 F.2d at 544; MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1133; Hecht v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977); but see Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 902
F.2d at 180 (expressly declining to consider whether a legitimate business purpose for the refusal
would defeat an essential facility case).
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So closely interrelated are these problems that it may be more accurate to
characterize them as facets of the same problem. First, the facility must be
"essential." That is, denial of facility must give its owner the power to eliminate
competition; the fact that denial of the facility may impose substantial costs on
the competitor is not enough.9 Second, there is no clear rule as to the price at
which the owner of the essential facility must sell. Presumably, the price attached
to an offer to sell may be so high that it will be treated as a refusal" because
otherwise the essential facility rule would be completely meaningless. However,
with one important exception, the courts have provided no guidance as to the
limits of the monopolist's freedom to price its essential facility. The exception is
that the owner may not retaliate against competitors by charging them a discrim-
inatorily higher price.100
The present essential facility rule will usually not be a very effective method
of eliminating monopolistic aftermarket prices. If the OEM sets the price in the
aftermarket high enough so that aftermarket competitors can continue to operate
without the facility or can pay the owner's price for the facility and still occupy
a portion of the market, a court is likely to conclude either that the facility is
not "essential," or that the owner has not "refused" to make it available, or
that the price is reasonable. That might make the market for the part more
"competitive" in the sense of "rivalrous" but would do little for consumers. To
eliminate monopolistic pricing would require a rule compelling the OEM to sell
to aftermarket competitors at marginal cost. However, it seems clear that the
cost of attempting to control the pricing, either by regulation or through litigation,
of all products in which there is a degree of legal natural monopoly power would
be disproportionate to the benefits of possible reduction in parts' prices.
If the OEM sells to middlemen, such as dealers, from whom aftermarket
competitors can buy the parts or services, there will usually be no remedy under
the essential facility rule for the OEM's refusal to sell directly to aftermarket
competitors. That is appropriate because the OEM should be in a position to
offer dealers the incentive of an assurance that they will not be in direct
competition with the OEM and the dealers are an alternative source of the parts.
While an individual dealer may decline to sell parts to competitors and, even
more likely, decline to sell parts at a discount from retail prices, unilateral action
by individual dealers is unlikely to be effective in keeping the parts out of the
hands of competitors. Some dealers will agree to sell parts to independents,
particularly by transhipping to those located outside their own area, when there
appears to be a reasonable prospect of keeping the sale secret and avoiding
retaliation. The prospect of a quick, virtually expense free sale of a substantial
98. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 543-46; Twin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health of Ill., 900 F.2d
566, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1990). See also MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1133; Olympia Equipment
Leasing v. Western Union Telephone Company, 797 F.2d 370, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1986).
99. In Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., the Second Circuit held that an "unreasonable" price (an
800% increase over a prior price) constitutes "refusal." Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 902 F.2d at
180. In Alaska Airlines, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to take the position on that issue. The
court also concluded that there had been no refusal because there was no indication that the
defendants had "ever set this fee at a level that would drive their competitors away." Alaska Airlines,
948 F.2d at 545.
100. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 410-11 (1912); MCI Communications,
708 F.2d at 1132-33.
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volume to aftermarket competitors of the OEM will overcome the purely "ethical"
considerations of some of the OEM's dealers.
If, on the other hand, the OEM sells only to end users and in quantities
which do not permit them to become resellers, the essential facility rule should
require the OEM to sell the parts to aftermarket competitors. The problem of
selecting the appropriate price can be resolved by prohibiting discrimination
against competitors. The OEM should be required to sell to aftermarket com-
petitors at a price no greater than its price to end users unless the OEM can
justify the higher price by higher costs of selling to the aftermarket competitors.10'
That will leave the OEM with some advantage over its aftermarket competitors
because they will be buying some parts at the same price as their customers but
in most cases the advantage will not be overwhelming because the "natural
monopoly parts" will constitute only a small percentage of the total cost of the
repair.
b. Preventing Dealers From Selling to Aftermarket Competitors
OEMs may go beyond refusing to sell directly by attempting to restrain their
dealers from reselling parts to independent wholesalers and dealers.'0 2 If they do
so by entering into "agreements" with their dealers the agreements will be within
the scope of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The legal status under Section 1 of OEM imposed restraints on dealers' sales
to independents is not entirely clear. 103 Vertical (between supplier and customer)
manufacturer imposed restraints limiting the territories and customer classes to
which a dealer can resell are subject to the rule of reason rather than the per se
rule.'04 They can be justified on a showing that the restraints increase the
effectiveness of the manufacturers competition by, for example, serving as a
necessary inducement to distributors to carry and promote the manufacturer's
products. Restraints on intrabrand competition are permitted in the interest of
more effective interbrand competition.
However, interbrand competition receives no apparent benefit when the
principal purpose and effect of the restraint is to impose additional cost and
burdens on the OEM's aftermarket competitors. Territory and customer restraints
imposed on dealers should be held unreasonable and illegal under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act if they prevent aftermarket competitors from buying parts at
prices no higher than dealers are charging their customers who purchase similar
or lower volumes.
The OEM may be reluctant to enter into restrictive agreements with its
dealers for fear of antitrust liability but attempt to accomplish the same result
by adopting a policy of refusing to sell, or sell at the same terms, to firms that
resell to independents. That will often be an ineffective tactic because dealers
101. There will still be difficult pricing problems in some cases. For example, when the OEM
sells the part only in a package with repair service, it would be necessary to separate the price of
the parts from the price of the labor.
102. Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds,
810 F.2d 1517 (1987).
103. An agreement between the OEM's dealers, however, would not only be unenforceable but a
per se illegal group boycott under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
104. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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will have an incentive to supply aftermarket competitors outside their own area.
Competitors will generally be able to find a source unless dealers are restricted
from supplying them not only by "agreements", but by agreements that are
legally enforceable. It is particularly unlikely to be effective unless dealers are
aware of the policy.
However, the combination of measures taken by the OEM to inform dealers
and to enforce the policy plus dealer adherence by refusing to sell to independents
may be held to constitute an "agreement" within Section 1. It has been held
that a tacit understanding or knowledge that concerted action is contemplated
plus adherence is sufficient'05 but the present status of the law on what constitutes
an "agreement" within Section 1 is unclear. 10°
Proof of an agreement has been made more difficult in many cases. Vertical
restraints, such as retail price fixing and restrictions on dealers as to the territories
in which, or customer to which, they may sell, may be in the ultimate interest
of the OEM, but are normally imposed for the immediate benefit of dealers.
When one dealer violates the restraint, other dealers may complain. The combi-
nation of dealer complaints plus termination of the offending dealer was probably
the most frequent basis for dealer suits alleging that their termination violated
the antitrust laws. That combination was also generally enough to get the case
to the jury. However, in Monsanto"07 and again, in Business Electronics v. Sharp
Electronics0 8 the U.S. Supreme Court held that such proof was insufficient to
prove an illegal agreement under Section 1.
Despite the more restrictive interpretation of the "agreement" requirement
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, an OEM relying on a refusal to deal to enforce
restrictions on dealers still faces substantial risk that a court may find an
agreement under Section 1. Dealers anxious for the OEM's business may state
to the OEM their intention to comply with the OEM's policy. That will create
an issue of whether the statement was purely voluntary or the result of express
or tacit solicitation of such statements by the OEM and, therefore, constitutes
an "agreement." Similarly, the threat of the loss of a good dealer may cause
the OEM to give the offending party a "second chance." Or, efforts to identify
violators may involve cooperation with other dealers or suppliers. Any of the
foregoing may result in a finding that there is a tacit agreement.
105. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Interstate Circuit Inc. v.
United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Standard Oil of California v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.
1957).
106. Initially, in United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 304-05 (1919), the Court held that a
firm was free to choose with whom it would deal. Despite the per se illegality of retail price fixing,
Colgate could legally announce that it would refuse to deal with retailers that cut prices and it could
carry out that threat. Subsequent cases, however, greatly eroded the Colgate rule, holding, for
example, that any policing of compliance with the policy would convert what was otherwise a
unilateral refusal to deal into an "agreement" prohibited by Section 1. The Colgate rule, while never
expressly overruled by the Supreme Court, was so eroded by United States v. Parke Davis Co., 362
U.S. 29 (1960) and the cases discussed therein, that it seems safe to say that, in effect, if it was
illegal to enter into an agreement restricting a practice of suppliers or customers, compliance with
the sellers' desires obtained by refusal to deal, or threat of refusal to deal, was also illegal. Recently,
however, Colgate has been given new life. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 761 (1984).
107. 465 U.S. 717 (1984).
108. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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Adding to the risks of attempting to enforce restraints by refusal to deal is
the fact that the personnel in contact with the dealers may not fully understand
the subtle distinction between firms that comply, possibly quite enthusiastically,
with the restraint because they want and depend on their competitors to do so,
and firms that "agree" to do so. It will be difficult to keep the record free of
oral and even written statements constituting evidence of an "agreement."
Consequently, attempting, by refusal to deal, to enforce restraints that would
be illegal under Section 1 if accomplished by an agreement, entails significant
antitrust risk and is likely not to be very effective.
c. Preventing Suppliers from Selling to Aftermarket Competitors or from
Selling to Them at the Same Price as to OEMs
i. Competitive Effect
When economies of scale are such that production costs per unit continue
to decline at production levels higher than the total demand for the part for the
OEM's brand, and there are available suppliers who are making the part, or
similar parts, for a broader market, economies of scale favor the OEM's pur-
chasing rather than manufacturing the part.' °9 In addition, capital requirements
and other factors may cause the OEM to prefer to buy rather than manufacture
the part. To preserve its ability to impose higher costs on its aftermarket
competitors when purchasing the part, however, the OEM must restrain its
supplier from selling to aftermarket competitors" or, at least, from selling to
them at the same price as to the OEM.
Such restraints have the obvious, immediate anti-competitive effect of in-
creasing aftermarket wholesaling and retailing competitors' costs, and as noted
above"' make it more difficult for aftermarket wholesaling and retailing com-
petitors to counter OEM advertising of "genuine" parts. There will sometimes
also, however, be pro-competitive effects as when an aftermarket monopoly will
increase efficiency."
2
109. The OEM could become a marketer of similar parts to others but lack of experience,
reluctance to buy from a competitor or the danger that additional capacity would drive prices down
to the extent that the investment in the additional capacity could not be recovered will often make
that an unattractive alternative.
110. Section III.A.2.b infra covers agreements under which suppliers are given "confidential"
plans and specifications for parts to manufacture for the OEM and agree to keep the information
confidential and use it only to produce parts for the OEM. See Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp., 613 F. Supp. 330 (C.D. I1. 1985), rev'd, 870 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 822 (1989), opinion on remand, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 169,415, 65,676, 65,680
(C.D. I11. 1991).
111. See supra Section II.B.2.
112. See supra Section I.B. Also, the restriction will sometimes result in the creation of a second
manufacturer of a part that would otherwise be the monopoly of the supplier to the OEM. While
that will sometimes be beneficial, it will often do little for consumers. When economies of scale
favor a single producer, the addition of a second producer with higher cost is not likely to reduce
parts prices. Since the OEM is in a position to determine which firm will be its supplier and thus
enjoy the original equipment business that supports the economies of scale, that supplier will not be
in a position to take monopoly profits. Aftermarket competitors will benefit more from buying from




Agreements restricting a supplier of standardized parts to a single OEM are
neither very common nor usually very dangerous to competition. Standardized
parts used in several OEMs' equipment will normally be manufactured by a
number of suppliers all producing at efficient levels. In the infrequent instances
where that is not the case and there is a monopolistic supplier of a necessary
part, no OEM's volume will be sufficient to induce the supplier to forego the
right to sell to others.
What is more common, however, both for standardized and unique parts
are announcements from parts suppliers that they supply only OEM's and their
price schedules containing, in addition to volume discounts, an "OEM price"
which is lower than the prices available to aftermarket competitors for shipments
of equal size. Such sales and pricing policies are undoubtedly adopted in large
part because the supplier understands that the policies increase its chances of
getting OEM business. The supplier's understanding may be based on threats
made in a public announcement by the OEM or more subtle methods. The
understanding may also be incorrect.
When the suppliers respond to the perceived threat of missing or losing OEM
business and rigorously follow their announced policies and price schedules, the
effect on aftermarket competition is no different from a legally enforceable
agreement restricting the supplier. Such rigorousness is probably uncommon. It
is in the supplier's interest to sell to both the OEM and to anyone else willing
and able to pay if it can avoid retaliation by the OEM. Thus, while the supplier
has an incentive to convince the OEM that it will not sell to competitors, it also
has an incentive to "cheat" and make such sales if it can do so without the
OEM discovering it. The same is true if an aftermarket competitor offers to
make a substantial purchase if given the same price as the OEM. OEM efforts
to prevent suppliers from dealing with aftermarket competitors through the use
of "refusal to deal" will have antitrust risks at least as great as when used to
prevent dealer sales to aftermarket competitors and are likely to be even less
effective.
ii. Application of the Antitrust Laws To OEM Restrictions on
Suppliers' Sales to Aftermarket Competitors
The foregoing analysis suggests that measures taken by OEMs to prevent
suppliers from selling to others must be judged on the facts of each case. It also
suggests that in the case of suppliers of parts unique to a single OEM, there
should be a presumption of anti-competitive effect requiring the defendant to
introduce evidence of a pro-competitive effect, such as evidence of its investment
in supplier training, in order to avoid liability.
Arguably that is the current law where the restrictions on supplier's sales to
others is by an "agreement"" ' 3 within the scope of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.1 4 While such agreements are not, and should not be, per se illegal, a
113. The discussion in Section III.A.l.b, supra, of when an OEM attempts to use "refusal to
deal" as a method of controlling dealer conduct will constitute an agreement within Section I is fully
applicable to attempts to restrict suppliers' sales.
114. Section 3 of the Clayton Act will not apply because it applies only to "sales on the condition"
that the buyer not purchase from others. It is directed only at restrictions imposed on customers by
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balancing of the pro and anti-competitive effects as is done in rule of reason
cases produces the results suggested above. '
Logically, one could go a step further and declare, by legislation or con-
struction of the antitrust laws, that OEM refusals to deal with suppliers because
the suppliers sell to aftermarket competitors at all or at the same price as to
OEMs is illegal and declare that suppliers' refusals to sell to aftermarket com-
petitors because of the OEM's policy are agreements within Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. There is nothing pro-competitive about such refusals and sales
policies to balance against their obvious anti-competitive effect.
Because of the availability of the private treble damage action, such rules
would undoubtedly generate a great deal of litigation, much of it frivolous, and
prevent efficiency enhancing changes of suppliers. Every supplier termination
would be at risk of a lawsuit claiming that the termination was to prevent sales
to aftermarket competitors. Similarly, every supplier that refused to sell to an
aftermarket competitor would be at a similar risk. That refusal to deal is probably
not a very effective method of preventing suppliers from selling to others. It is
probably best to ignore such OEM policies, and suppliers' reactions to them,
unless there is an "agreement" within section 1 or a monopolization or attempt
to monopolize under section 2 as those acts are presently construed.11 6
When suppliers "unilaterally" give OEMs a lower price, the Robinson
Patman Act may be applicable. Sections 2(a) and 2(f)" 7 respectively prohibit
discriminating in price between competitors if the result may be to substantially
lessen competition with the seller or the favored customer and buyers from
inducing discrimination. The Act applies only to the sale of commodities and
not services"' and is subject to the exceptions that permit discrimination where
justified by a cost savings in selling to the favored customer - the "cost
justification" defense - or where necessary to meet competition - the "meeting
competition" defense.
The parts supplier's sales would be within the scope of the Robinson Patman
Act if the parts are resold by the OEM in the aftermarket, but not if the OEM
uses them in manufacturing new equipment. The OEM's "knowing receipt" of
an illegal lower price will expose the OEM to liability under Section 2(f) of the
Act. However, because of the large volume of purchases by the OEM, there will
usually be numerous firms willing to grant discounts and the suppliers selected
by the OEM will often have a meeting competition defense.
sellers, not at restrictions imposed on sellers by customers. It could, however, become applicable
indirectly through section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Hershey Chocolate Corp. v.
F.T.C., 121 F.2d 968 (3rd Cir. 1941).
115. In Kodak there were agreements between Kodak and its parts suppliers restricting them from
selling to aftermarket competitors which were found to be illegal. They were found to be illegal,
however, not because of their impact on parts prices, but as part of a per se illegal tying arrangement
whereby Kodak's power over its parts market was used to obtain a monopoly in the market for
servicing Kodak equipment. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2077-78.
116. A possible alternative which would reduce the risk of excessive lawsuits would be to enact
legislation restricting the right to refuse to deal in these circumstances, and to provide legislation
enforceable only by federal, state or local law enforcement agencies. Private actions would be
prohibited.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1992).
118. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986),
reh'g denied 788 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1986).
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In addition, liability under the Robinson Patman Act requires two sales at
different prices. It can always be avoided by not selling to a firm at all. Thus,
where the disparity between the potential orders from the OEM and the size of
the potential orders from aftermarket competitors is large, the supplier that fears
Robinson Patman Act liability is likely to solve the problem by refusing to sell
to independents at any price. That is helpful neither to aftermarket competitors
nor to consumers.
Finally, by giving suppliers an argument to use in resisting customer pressure
for lower prices, the net impact of the Act may come closer to raising all parts
prices to the higher level paid by aftermarket firms rather than reducing after-
market prices to OEM levels. It seems at least as likely that repeal of the
Robinson Patman Act would lower aftermarket prices as would more vigorous
enforcement of the Act.
d. Tooling Arrangements
As noted above, when per unit cost continues to decline beyond production
levels required to supply a single OEM, economies of scale favor purchase of
the part rather than vertical integration into producing the part by the OEM. In
the case of parts unique to a single brand of original equipment, however,
manufacture of the unique part will often require specialized inputs, such as
tooling which the outside parts supplier does not use in its other operations.
Because of the limited potential demand from other buyers, parts suppliers may
be reluctant to assume the cost of obtaining the tooling.
Where the tooling, as a practical matter, can be transferred between potential
suppliers of the part, an obvious solution is for the OEM to purchase, retain
ownership of, and provide the tooling to, whichever supplier offers the best terms
from time to time. Such arrangements are referred to herein as "tooling arrange-
ments" because they most commonly apply to tooling, but they could also be
used for other kinds of specialized inputs. The problem with tooling arrangements
is that, as would be expected, the agreements normally provide that the tooling
will be used only in producing parts for the OEM, a restriction that will often
have an anti-competitive effect.
When the per unit cost of using the tooling continues to decline at production
levels higher than an aftermarket competitor could expect to sell, the effect of
tooling arrangements is to create a differential between the OEM's costs and the
costs of aftermarket competitors. When the supplier provides its own tooling,
the cost of the tooling will normally be reflected in the price of the product and
each buyer pays for it in proportion to the amount of its purchases. Smaller
purchasers get a portion of the benefit of the economies of scale made possible
by the large purchaser's orders. The large buyer also receives a proportional
benefit from the orders of the smaller buyers but the net effect (absent seller
price discrimination) is that large and small buyers have the same cost when the
seller owns the tooling. In contrast, if an OEM can restrict use of the tooling to
production for its orders, aftermarket competitors will often be excluded, resulting
in an increased differential between the costs of the OEM and aftermarket
competitors.
Even if some aftermarket supplier duplicates the tooling and manufactures
the part, there will be waste in that a needless set of tooling will be produced.
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Also, because of the necessity to amortize the tooling over smaller volume, the
aftermarket supplier will have higher costs than the OEM. Thus, when economies
of scale in the use of inputs other than tooling favor purchase of the part,
restricting the use of the tooling allows the OEM to obtain the same advantage
over aftermarket competitors as the OEM obtains by in-house manufacture. The
OEM will be able to obtain monopolistic profits in the aftermarket because no
one else will be able to compete effectively except at prices above the OEM'S
cost.
Since the restriction on the use of the tooling to manufacturing for the OEM
is part of the agreement by which the tooling is provided, it is within the literal
scope of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It is however, a restriction imposed by
the OEM on the use of its own property which may be necessary to providing
the tooling and, therefore, pro-competitive.
Whether tooling arrangements are pro or anti-competitive on balance depends
in part on the availability of alternative, less restrictive, methods of getting the
supplier to make the investment in the tooling when providing the OEM's
requirements is necessary to give the supplier sufficient volume to amortize the
investment. The obvious substitutes are agreements to purchase a sufficient
quantity to justify the supplier's investment in the tooling. Requirements or fixed
amount contracts covering a period of time are common contractual devices for
a number of purposes and can be used to give the supplier sufficient security to
be willing to make the investment necessary to manufacture and sell the part at
competitive prices. Drafting a contract to govern the sales which will occur in
the future is often difficult, however, because it requires anticipating and pro-
viding for the changes which may occur. Moreover, attempting to assure future
competitive prices by contract may involve higher transaction costs and be a less
reliable method of controlling costs than contemporaneous competition. It cannot
be assumed that forward contracting is always a satisfactory substitute for tooling
arrangements.
Clearly, restrictions in tooling arrangements have mixed effects on compe-
tition. They have a generally anti-competitive effect, but often less anti-competitive
than the alternative methods of obtaining investment in the tooling necessary for
manufacture of the parts. Moreover, tooling is subject to wear and OEMs could
not justly be required to provide its use free of charge when used to make parts
for competitors. Ruling that tooling arrangements limiting the right to use the
tooling to production for the OEM are illegal will thus either eliminate the use
of such agreements or require the courts to make decisions on the proper price
for the use of the tooling on a case-by-case basis, a responsibility the courts
probably would, and should, reject.
In the absence of persuasive evidence indicating that tooling arrangements
are a major factor contributing to monopolistic parts prices, it is probably best
to treat tooling agreements restricting the use of tooling as at least presumptively,
if not per se, legal.
e. Discounts Based on Long Production Runs
The generally larger requirements of an OEM enable it to place larger orders
and to negotiate a discount because longer production runs reduce setup costs.
However, the supplier will attempt to combine production for the OEM's orders
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with orders from other suppliers, including aftermarket competitors. By offering
the same price incentives to the aftermarket competitors, suppliers can set up
even longer production runs to further lower production costs. When set up costs
are appreciable, combining orders is pro-competitive because it increases efficien-
cies and tends to lower supplier's costs and prices.
An OEM's interests are not always served by combining orders and charging
all customers a uniform price. Increasing the size of production runs by filling
the OEM's orders in the same run as smaller orders from others will reduce
supplier's costs and prices to all customers, however; in comparison to manufac-
turing each customer's orders on a separate production run, combining orders
reduces costs and prices on a per unit basis much more to the smaller customers
than to the OEM. Therefore, the OEM loses a part of its advantage over
aftermarket competitors.
To preserve its advantage the OEM may try to prevent the supplier from
combining its orders with the orders of aftermarket competitors in a single
production run. If a supplier agrees not to manufacture for an OEM's competitors
as part of the same production run, the agreement would probably violate Section
1 of the Sherman Act. Agreements to treat the size and timing of the OEM's
orders as confidential would probably pass antitrust scrutiny, but such agreements
would be much less effective. They would inhibit the ability of aftermarket
competitors to initiate negotiations for lower priced productions orders by com-
bining their orders with an OEM's. These agreements, however, would not prevent
the supplier from soliciting business for the same time as the OEM's production
run and reflecting the cost reductions in its price to all customers.
The OEM's tactic may also run afoul of the Robinson Patman Act's
prohibition of price discrimination. The supplier and the OEM may argue that
the OEM's larger orders make possible the longer production runs, which justifies
a lower price. That argument is unlikely to prevail where the OEM has taken
measures to prevent the supplier from combining orders. Customers' orders
contribute to the cost reduction resulting from longer production runs in pro-
portion to the size of the order. The general rule is that the seller "must charge
all costs to all customers on some calculus of proportionality . ... 119
2. Restricting the Dissemination of Information
To effectively restrain OEM parts pricing, aftermarket competitors must
know the plans and specifications of OEM parts, the OEM's parts information,
the parts' interchangeability, the identity of the OEM's suppliers, and the OEM's
aftermarket prices. This gives OEMs an incentive not to disseminate this infor-
mation to aftermarket competitors.120 Their ability to do so depends largely on
whether the information has been protected as a trade secret.
To be a trade secret, information must be developed within the firm, generally
unknown to others, disclosed only to those with an express or implied obligation
to preserve its secrecy, valuable to the firm that developed it, and costly for a
119. FREDERICK W. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON PATMAN ACT 305 (1962).
See also id. at 269-72, 281.
120. The legislation requiring OEMs to make information available to aftermarket competitors
which is proposed in Section III.B.1 would, if enacted, moot the issues raised in this section III.C.2(c).
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competitor to duplicate. 2 1 The antitrust laws will not prevent the OEM from
protecting trade secrets against use by aftermarket competitors.
To the extent that the OEM can keep trade secret information "in house"
by manufacturing the parts itself and providing sales and maintenance services
directly, rather than through dealers, aftermarket competitors seeking to obtain
the information will have to rely on the essential facility doctrine, under Section
2 of the Sherman Act. Even though reaffirmed in Kodak, however, the essential
facility doctrine does not appear likely to provide a broadly useful remedy because
of the problem of setting a price for the information. Unlike setting a price for
"natural monopoly" parts discussed above, using the price at which information
is sold to others will not work because generally there is no "sale" of the
information. The information is incorporated as part of the original equipment,
parts or services provided by the OEM.
Usually the OEM will be required to give others the information. For
example, suppliers providing unique parts to the OEM will need its plans and
specifications and when dealers are needed to do maintenance and carry inven-
tories of parts, they will need interchangeability and price information. The desire
to preserve its relationship with the OEM may cause the supplier or dealer to
refuse to provide the information to an aftermarket competitor. However, pro-
viding the information may enable the supplier or dealer to make additional
sales, providing an incentive to "cheat." Even if the OEM is aware of the
"leak", it may still be difficult to identify the source. Also, if the OEM stops
dealing with a supplier or dealer, the incentive to comply with the demands or
desires of the OEM is likely to disappear. The terminated dealer will sell the
information for whatever it can get. Legally enforceable confidentiality agreements
will be required to prevent aftermarket competitors from obtaining end using
OEM information which has been disseminated. While such agreements are within
the scope of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, agreements to keep information
confidential have not, without more, been held to violate the antitrust laws.
Thus, so long as the OEM's information continues to meet the requirements of
a trade secret, it can be used to obtain monopolistic profits. That will not always
be possible, much less practical.
a. Agreements to Conceal the Identity of Parts Suppliers
Suppliers are likely to broadcast the fact that they are supplying the OEM,
unless the OEM prevents them from doing so. The preference for OEM parts
122
will aid the seller in efforts to sell directly to consumers, wholesalers and retailers.
To prevent such competition, the OEM may require that the supplier not publicize
the fact that it is the OEM's supplier. In addition or in the alternative, the OEM
may prohibit the supplier from placing its own trademark on the parts. The
extent to which lists of suppliers and information about them are trade secrets
if adequately protected by contract is unclear. 23 The general rule is that the more
121. SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1256 (3rd Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). See generally, ROGER M. MILGRIM, 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2
(1967).
122. See supra Part II.A.
123. See MILoRIM, supra note 121, at 2-303.
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valuable the information to competitors and the more expensive it is to for them
to obtain the information by independent means, such as reverse engineering,
the more likely the information will be treated as a trade secret. 24 Put another
way, the more anti-competitive it is to preserve the trade secret, the more likely
it is to be protected.
The effect of successfully preventing competitors from identifying the supplier
is similar to the effect of prohibiting the OEM's supplier from selling to
competitors. If the supplier is unknown it may be impossible to buy from it.
The aftermarket competitor may be buying the part from the same supplier as
the OEM but not know it. The inability to advertise that fact to consumers
decreases consumer information.
I have found no judicial opinions expressly covering the legality of agreements
denying firms the right to publicize the fact that they supply the OEM. However,
if the agreement is successful in making it difficult for aftermarket competitors
to identify the OEM's supplier, it should be illegal under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act in the same circumstances as agreements expressly restricting the
supplier to selling only to the OEM.
b. Agreements to Conceal Plans and Specifications for Parts
When a third party manufactures a unique part for the OEM, the OEM will
typically provide the plans and specifications subject to an agreement that they
remain the property of the OEM, are kept confidential, and are used solely to
produce the part for the OEM.12S This protects their trade secret status and keeps
the parts out of the hands of aftermarket competitors. The trade secret status
may be lost when the parts are embodied in equipment put on the market if the
parts can, be readily reproduced by examination or reverse engineering. The
critical factor will often be the degree of difficulty and expense of duplicating
the part without the benefit of the plaintiff's plans and specifications.1 26 In
addition, a number of courts have granted some relief when a trade secret was
lost because putting the product on sale made reverse engineering possible. They
have enjoined a competitor from using information obtained in breach of an
express obligation of confidentiality or assessed damages for its use.
127
If the OEM's restrictions on suppliers last no longer than trade secret laws
protect the information, they should not present antitrust problems. The restric-
tion in the agreement is ancillary to the agreement to manufacture and supply
the product to the OEM. This agreement may be pro-competitive as compared
to the OEM's manufacturing in house. If the agreement restricts the supplier for
a longer period than is reasonably necessary to reverse engineer the product, the
124. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); S.L Handling Systems, 753 F.2d at 1256; See
Sigma Chemical Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a secret list of chemical
suppliers created at great cost by plaintiff and which would have been difficult for competitors to
reproduce constituted a trade secret).
125. See e.g., Rockwell Graphics Systems, Inc. v. Dev. Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir.
1991).
126. MILGRIM, supra note 121, at § 2.05[2 and [3].
127. Specifically, courts have enjoined the use of such information for the amount of time by
which defendant's putting the product on the market was shortened by its misconduct. Schulenberg
v. Signatrol, 212 N.E.2d 865, 869-870, 33 1Il.2d 379 (1965); Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson,
484 F.2d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 1973); Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 224 N.W.2d 80, 95 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
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agreement is anti-competitive. It should be held to violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act when applied to aftermarket competitors copying of OEM parts.
Some states have enacted legislation or adopted rules designed to restrict
copying or make it more expensive. Challenges to the legality of such provisions
have met with mixed results. 12 Such state statutes and rules should be held to
be in conflict with the federal antitrust laws if applicable to aftermarket com-
petitors.
c. Agreements to Conceal Price and Part Number Information
OEMs typically provide their dealers with parts books and price lists for
each model they produce. These materials identify each part with the description,
the part number, and the price. That part number is used only for parts that
are identical or interchangeable. With the information in a set of parts books,
competitors familiar with the system can determine which models use the same
part to fulfill a particular function.
The importance of this information to competitors is apparent' 29 and dupli-
cating it without the OEM's parts books and price lists will be expensive and
time consuming, particularly when the equipment is complex and comes in a
number of models. Parts interchange data and price lists will meet the tests for
a trade secret as long as they are kept "in-house" or disclosed only to those
who have a duty to keep them confidential. 3 0 To preserve its trade secret status
and to prevent it from getting into the hands of aftermarket competitors, the
OEM may require dealers to agree to treat the information as confidential. In
addition, the OEM may prohibit its suppliers of standard parts from putting
their own part numbers on the parts because supplier part numbers can be used
by aftermarket competitors to determine the interchangeability of standard parts.
The courts have decided the legality of agreements between original equipment
manufacturers and their distributors or customers not to disseminate appear not
to have parts books or the interchange and price information they contain.
However, the general rules under Section 1 of the Sherman Act seem clearly
applicable to such agreements. They are anti-competitive because they raise
competitors' costs without a counterbalancing pro-competitive effect.
3. Tying Arrangement,
The OEM may condition the grant of a dealership or sales to consumers on
the dealers' or consumers' agreement to purchase aftermarket parts or services
from the OEM or its dealers. Such tying arrangements or "tie-ins" are generally
128. Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684-685 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding California "plug
molding" statute which prohibited the use of plug molds, a process "substantially less expensive than
developing a mold from scratch") Id. at 684. Contra Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 655 F.
Supp. 750, 762-763 (E.D. Louisiana 1987), aff'd, 847 F.2d 255, 268-270 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
a Louisiana statute permitting computer programs licenses to prohibit the licensee from "reverse
engineering" the program was invalid because inconsistent with federal copyright law); Merchant
Suppliers Paper Co. v. Photo-Marker Corp., 285 N.Y.S.2d 932, 934-936 (App. Div. 1967) (holding
that when equipment sold, seller could not impose a restriction on its use which would prevent it
from being reverse engineered).
129. See supra Part II.B.
130. The cases involving price books go both ways, probably because they are very fact specific.
MORIM, supra note 121, at § 209 [8] [b].
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said to be per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of
the Clayton Act 3' if the seller has market power in the tying product and a




Kodak defined the required economic power as "the power to force a
purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market ...
the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output."' 33 Market share
is frequently treated as a surrogate for the economic power to coerce the buyers
to buy other products1 3 4 but the market share indicative of market power or its
absence is not clearly established. 
3
1
A legitimate business purpose can justify an otherwise per se illegal tying
arrangement. Business justifications may include the necessity of guaranteeing a
high quality product as a way of breaking into the market. 36 However, the
defendant may be required to prove that there was no other way of accomplishing
the same purpose which would have been less restrictive of competition. 1
7
The "two separate products" criteria is often critical in tie-in cases. The test
suggested for the existence of separate products is whether the products can be
selected and provided separately consistent with economic efficiency. 38 This
depends on whether the demand for each can be separated.1 9
a. Tie-ins Imposed on Dealers
OEM's may condition appointing a firm as a dealer in the original equipment
on the dealer's agreeing either not to buy parts from aftermarket competitors,
or to buy all or most of the parts it requires from the OEM. This eliminates or
severely restricts the dealer's ability to buy parts from anyone else."40 Even
without an agreement of any kind, the OEM may provide better delivery terms,
a larger allocation of desired models, or other forms of favoritism to the dealers
who are more faithful in buying parts from the OEM. It may decline to renew
the dealership of those dealers who do not buy sufficient OEM parts. This is
131. 15 U.S.C. § 14. Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits sales "on the condition, agreement
or understanding that the buyer will not use or deal in" (emphasis added) the product of a competitor
where the effect of the condition "may be to substantially lessen competition." (emphasis added) It
applies generally to exclusive dealing or requirement contracts imposed by sellers on buyers. The
effect of the "may be" language is to make it applicable to agreements which have no present anti-
competitive effect but are likely to do so in the future. It appears, however, only to sales of
"commodities" not sales of services. Satellite Television & Associated Resource, Inc. v. Continental
Cablevision of Virginia, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 538 (4th Cir. 1983).
132. Jefferson Parrish, 466 U.S. at 13-21 (1984); Northern Pacific Railway Co., 356 U.S. at 6.
133. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2080-81.
134. Id.
135. Compare Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), reaff'd, 286 F.2d
832 (4th Cir. 1961) (10% sufficient to indicate economic power) with Jefferson Parrish, 466 U.S. at
26 (30% not sufficient without more to infer market power).
136. Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988); Mozart Co.
v. Mercedes Benz of North Amer., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987).
137. Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1342; Metrix Warehouse v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828
F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987); Susser v. Carvel Corporation, 323 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
138. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2080; Jefferson Parrish, 466 U.S. at 21-24. See Christianson v. Colt
Industries Operating Corp., 1990-91 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,415, 65,678-89 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
139. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2080, Dimidowich, 803 F.2d 1473, 1480-1481 (9th Cir. 1986), modified
on other issues, 810 F.2d 1517 (1987).
140. Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1037 nn.7 & 8.
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particularly likely when the OEM is selling the original equipment at an artificially
low price in the expectation of receiving high margins on the sale of parts.
The overall effect on competition of such restrictions is unclear. An imme-
diate anti-competitive effect seems apparent as the restriction deprives aftermarket
manufacturing competitors of a prime market for the parts - the OEM'S dealers.
This may decrease competition in parts manufacturing.
Market power can exist at the distribution level as. well as at the manufac-
turing level. If dealers have a monopoly in their territories, increasing manufac-
turing competition will shift the power to obtain monopolistic profits from the
manufacturer to the distributors. That will not benefit consumers. Moreover,
aftermarket manufacturing competitors may develop distributors of their own or
go into distribution of the parts themselves if they are deprived of the OEM's
dealers as an outlet. This will generate additional competition in distribution of
the parts. In addition, when the OEM is selling to only one dealer in an area,'
4'
a requirement that the dealer buy the OEM'S parts may be necessary to ensure
that the OEM's parts are properly represented and that the equipment is properly
serviced. 142
Restricting the dealer to the OEM'S parts may also minimize deception."43
A significant part of the public probably assumes that the OEM'S dealers will
carry only the OEM'S parts and expect repairs on thefr equipment to be made
with OEM parts. That expectation is most likely to be fulfilled if the dealer has
no other, or at least no cheaper, parts available.
"Agreements" not to carry replacement parts produced by aftermarket
competitors which are anti-competitive in effect are prohibited as unreasonable
restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and by Section 3 of the Clayton
Act. Under Section 3, only a potential anti-competitive effect need be shown.'4
Therefore, no special per se rule is needed for tying arrangements to prevent
anti-competitive OEM restrictions on dealers carrying competing lines of replace-
ment parts. The rule may prevent efficiency improving restrictions on dealers and
it should be abandoned as applied to such arrangements. Moreover, the market
power test for application of the per se rule to tie-ins works poorly to prevent
monopolistic parts prices or to prevent "unfair" treatment of dealers and may
prohibit pro-competitive restrictions on dealers.
The tie-in cases involving dealerships generally allege that the original equip-
ment is the tying product and that the parts are the tied product." 45 This makes
the OEM's market share in the original equipment the focus of interest in
determining market power."4 That seems questionable in the case of OEMs
requiring dealers to carry OEM parts. The tie-in is imposed on the dealer, not
the consumer, and the tying product that creates any leverage that exists is not
141. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss when such agreements are pro-competitive
and anti-competitive.
142. Grappone, 858 F.2d at 792.
143. Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1038 (defense rejected by the court on the ground that other
methods could have been used).
144. See supra note 131.
145. Grappone, 858 F.2d at 792.; Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1342; Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at
1037.
146. Grappone, 858 F.2d at 793.
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just the ability to purchase the original equipment but the dealership as a whole.' 47
The value of the dealership and the amount of leverage it creates to force dealers
to buy parts from the OEM is not necessarily related to the OEM's market share
for the original equipment. A dealership for a less popular brand can be more
valuable than a dealership for a brand with a large market share if the OEM
for the less popular brand offers larger margins, a larger, better-protected territory
or other more favorable terms. To the extent that market power is focused on
market share, the inquiry should be directed at the market for dealerships.
However, if a dealer's facility and goodwill are closely tied in the public mind
to a particular product and a particular brand of that product, the OEM will
have considerable power to impose new requirements on its dealers. This is true
regardless of the availability of other dealerships or the brands market share
unless the dealers have protected themselves by contractual provisions.
b. Tie-ins Imposed on Consumers
Direct tying agreements with consumers requiring them to buy only after-
market parts and services produced or wholesaled by the OEM or its dealers
seem to be relatively uncommon. Theoretically, these agreements can monopolize
the aftermarket though they will often be very difficult to enforce.
The deciding question in consumer tie-in cases is whether the original
equipment and its maintenance are a single product fulfilling the function the
original equipment is designed to serve or whether it is a product separate from
the replacement parts and other maintenance services. If there is a single product,
the tie in rule is inapplicable. The test for single versus separate products which
is best designed to serve the purposes of the antitrust laws is whether competition
in original equipment will eliminate the possibility of monopolistic pricing for
the combination of the original equipment and its maintenance. Under that test,
original equipment and replacement parts are separate markets.1'"
Competition in both ..the original equipment and the aftermarket more
effectively protects consumers than competition in the original equipment and
monopoly in the aftermarket. However, in some circumstances an OEM after-
market monopoly may be more efficient and produce lower consumer prices or
more competition in the original equipment. 49 Therefore, tying arrangements
between original equipment and aftermarket parts and services should never be
treated as per se illegal. That is particularly true when the agreement for the
purchase of the original equipment clearly informs buyers that they will be
required to obtain aftermarket parts or services from the OEM or its dealers.
147. The fact that it is the dealership which is the tying "product" rather than any item the
dealership buys or sells is supported by cases such as Roberts v. Elaine Powers Figure Salons, Inc.,
708 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1983); Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d
1002 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); Siegle v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1975) holding the franchise or trademarks to be a tying item
distinct from the product or services purchased. Contra Kugler v. Aamco Automatic Transmissions,
Inc., 460 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1972).
148. See supra Section I.A.2.
149. See discussion of metering, quality control and risk allocation in Section I.B supra. See also
W. David Slawson, Excluding Competition Without Monopoly Power: The Use of Tying Arrangements
to Exploit Market Failure, ANTITRUsT BuLL., Summer 1991, at 457 (arguing that market power is
largely irrelevant to effect of a tie-in on competition).
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Existing law should be more radically revised when applied to OEM practices
which sell the original equipment and aftermarkets parts and services only as a
package. Examples of such practices include lease only policies and long term
warranties requiring that the OEM's parts and services be used for maintenance
and repair. These practices are within the definition of tying arrangements because
one cannot purchase the original equipment without effectively agreeing to get
parts and service from the OEM. 50 However, they are unlikely to have anti-
competitive results or raise prices. Aftermarket competition is required because
the buyer of original equipment is locked into parts compatible with that
equipment, but does not and cannot know the future price of the parts."' This
reasoning is inapplicable to aftermarket monopolies resulting from lease only
policies or warranties because the price of parts and services covered by a
warranty is paid at the time of purchasing the original equipment. In the case
of a lease which the lessee can terminate if the lessor changes the terms, not
only is the full price known but there is no "lock in" effect.
It is true that monopolization of one product by a tying arrangement
employed by a firm with market power in another market requires an entrant to
enter at both levels and may restrict entry. 5 2 This will rarely be a factor relevant
to the competitive effect of tying arrangements. Entering the market for the
original equipment will require any OEM to enter the parts market regardless of
whether tying arrangements are in effect. There may be exceptions where the
repair parts and maintenance services are standard parts and readily available
from numerous sources, but buyers will generally demand assurance that after-
market parts and services will be available before they buy the original equipment.
Therefore, the fact that aftermarket competition is prevented by a refusal to sell
equipment except as part of a package including repair parts and services should
not be a basis for finding that refusal to be illegal.
4. Vertical Integration
In general, the more completely the OEM is able to integrate vertically, the
more effectively and safely it can impose added costs on its aftermarket com-
petitors. It can control its facilities that produce and distribute its parts and
equipment to consumers and do so without any agreement within the scope of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
-Integrating "backward" into the manufacture of parts permits the OEM to
sell the part at a price that reflects the higher cost of manufacturing the part in
the smaller quantities that aftermarket competitors can expect to sell. Both
backward integration into parts supply and forward integration into distribution
and maintenance increase the ability of the OEM to keep parts information and
the parts themselves out of the hands of aftermarket competitors. It is generally
easier, and certainly safer under the antitrust laws, for a firm to control the
activities of its own employees than to control the activities of independent firms.
Vertical integration, however, is not always economically feasible and can entail
its own antitrust risks.
150. That was recognized even in the dissenting opinion in Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2095.
151. See supra Section I.A.2.
152. Fortner, 394 U.S. at 509.
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a. Economic Restraints on Vertical Integration
Vertical integration into the manufacture of parts will increase the OEM's
manufacturing costs when economies of scale favor production at levels higher
than the OEM's requirements. It will then be cheaper to buy the parts than to
manufacture them. Vertical integration into distribution usually presents even
greater problems.
If equipment is composed of parts that will wear out unevenly or are
susceptible to breakage and the equipment is valuable enough to justify repair it
will be unmarketable unless the purchaser has assurances that someone has the
information, the skill and the parts necessary to do the job. When that infor-
mation must be disseminated to third parties, aftermarket competitors are more
likely to acquire it. Vertical integration into maintenance of the equipment can
sometimes be so complete that the OEM is the only one that will need the parts
information to repair the equipment is possible. However, this will require either
that the equipment be sent to the OEM's manufacturing facilities, that the OEM
create numerous local facilities to perform the maintenance, or that the OEM
send its personnel and equipment to the customer's location. The first alternative
will be impracticable in the case of bulky equipment and likely to meet buyer
resistance. The latter two alternatives involve large capital requirements or ex-
penses for the OEM. Any of the alternatives require a willingness on the part of
users of the equipment to forego any competition in repair, including the ability
to do in-house repairs and maintenance.
Forgoing competition may be acceptable or even demanded when the product
is novel or highly technical and there is no established group of firms other than
the OEM capable of adequately maintaining and repairing the product. For the
most part, purchasers who have an alternative will be unwilling to put themselves
so completely in the hands of a seller unless they have some way of controlling
repair costs by contract or the seller assumes the risk of breakdown either by a
lease rather than a sale of the equipment or by a long term and very complete
warranty.
b. Vertical Integration by Internal Growth versus by Acquisition
When vertical integration is economically practical and the OEM can create
the capacity to produce or distribute the parts, the antitrust laws provide no
reliable way of preventing OEMs from vertically integrating to take monopoly
profits in the aftermarket. The OEM can refuse to provide parts and information
to competitors without agreement with anyone. Its refusal will be subject to the
restraints of Section 2 of the Sherman Act that are limited in scope and will not
force OEM parts prices to a competitive level.
Growth by internal expansion requires the creation of additional capacity
which may be unprofitable for the OEM. That will tend to be the case when
there is already adequate or even excess capacity. If the OEM creates additional
capacity, prices may be forced down to the point where the OEM cannot obtain
a return on its investment.
The obvious solution is to buy existing capacity that will not add to total
capacity and not create additional downward pressure on price. However, ac-
quisitions of stock or assets are subject to Section 7 of the Clayton Act as well
as Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
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c. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions of stock or assets where
"the effect may be to substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce
in any section of the country." It is applicable to both horizontal (between
competitors) and vertical (between suppliers and customers) mergers. An acqui-
sition agreement may also constitute a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 153
While vertical integration by acquisition often increases efficiency, for ex-
ample, by reducing transaction costs, in some situations it also reduces efficiency
and has anti-competitive effects. When the total volume of a part supports only
a single supplier, the most efficient and pro-competitive result occurs when the
OEM purchases the part from an outside supplier who (1) will be restrained
from obtaining monopolistic profits by the OEM's ability to switch suppliers and
(2) will sell to aftermarket competitors at the same price as to the OEM. When
the OEM acquires stock or assets in lieu of purchasing from such a supplier, the
acquisition forecloses competitors from the largest and most economical source
of supply. This foreclosure is a basis for holding vertical acquisitions of suppliers
illegal under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 5 4 The vertical acquisition cases
generally involve foreclosure of competitors of the supplier from the market
represented by the customer firm by foreclosing buyers from a source of supply
that is, or may become, particularly important because of the large market share
or lower costs.' When the OEM's only advantage of the acquisition is to prevent
aftermarket competitors from access to the lowest cost source of supply, 5 6 the
acquisition should be held illegal under Section 7.
5. Failure of OEMs to Compete in Each Others Aftermarkets
Competing OEMs of the same products could be each others most effective
aftermarket competitors, particularly for standard parts. They will have the
relatively high volume and the economies of scale that result from purchasing
parts for both original equipment and their own aftermarket. They will also have
153. The two statutes have long been thought, however to play different roles. Section 1 has
been construed as prohibiting only agreements having an actual anti-competitive effect while Section
7 is an incipiency statute forbidding acquisitions that have no immediate anti-competitive consequences
but have a potential for an adverse effect in the future. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. New Jersey
Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 323 (1965); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S.
158, 170-171 (1964). The continuing validity of that distinction has recently been thrown into question.
In United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 295
(1990), the court stated that over the years the construction of Sections 1 and 7 had converged so
that now "both statutes as currently understood prevent transactions likely to reduce competition
substantially." Id. at 1281-82.
154. Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962); Heatransfer Corp. v.
Volkswagenwerk A. G., 553 F.2d 964, 981-982 (5th Cir. 1977); United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion
Engineering, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
155. United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 104-105 (S.D. N.Y. 1964), aff'd
per curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965); Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 173,035,
pp.88,052, 88,053 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 70 T.C. 73,292 (9th Cir. 1970); See also,
Combustion Engineering, Inc., 203 F. Supp. at 556; Record Club of America, Inc. v. Capital Records,
Inc., 1971 T.C. 173,694 at 90,899 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
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the greater credibility that comes from being a large, well known company. It
will be more difficult to characterize a competing OEM as a "fly-by-night"
operation. However, it does not appear that OEMs actively solicit the parts
business of the dealers of competing OEMs. While there are exceptions,' 57 OEMs
seldom attempt to provide their dealers with parts and information to service
competing brands. Little, if any, advertising's directed at consumers to use the
parts sold by one OEM on equipment manufactured by a competing OEM.
Agreements between OEMs not to compete in each other's aftermarkets are
per se illegal conspiracies. However, the cases do not reflect the existence of such
agreements and there is no reason to believe that such agreements are common.
An agreement is rarely necessary to convince an OEM to exercise restraint in
soliciting the aftermarket business of competing brands. Each OEM's knowledge
that it would invite retaliation if it moved vigorously into its competitor's
aftermarkets is sufficient to explain the lack of aftermarket competition. Adver-
tising parts for competing brands of equipment would undercut consumer directed
advertising campaigns for "genuine" parts because the implied premise of such
advertising is that the parts sold by an OEM are the best and cannot be reliably
duplicated by anyone else.
6. Avoiding the Use of Standardized Parts
Economies of scale rarely add to the OEM's power to charge monopolistic
prices for standardized parts used in a variety of types of equipment.' Whether
OEMs purposely design equipment to use unique parts solely to obtain monop-
olistic profits'5 9 in the aftermarket is uncertain. A disadvantage to that strategy
is that designing and manufacturing unique parts usually costs more than the use
of standard parts. Thus, the supra-competitive profits on replacement parts must
compensate for the added cost of both the original equipment and the replacement
parts before producing a net gain.
That would require a relatively large aftermarket in comparison to the original
equipment market. There are markets such as the razor/razor blade markets in
which the market for replacement parts is much larger than the market for the
original equipment. In such markets a large incentive exists to design aftermarket
parts that are non-standard and incompatible with competitors' original equip-
ment. Under these circumstances some of the reasons that aftermarket monopolies
permit monopolistic pricing for the original equipment combined with its main-
tenance are less applicable. One of those factors is that the owner is "locked"
into parts which are compatible with the equipment and the OEM can either
exclusively provide or provide more cheaply than others. Where the cost of the
equipment is small in relation to the cost of the aftermarket items, the "lock"
is weaker because the owner of the equipment will discard it sooner. He will
157. Myram Borders, Big Three Market Spares, U.P.I., Nov. 17, 1983, financial section. (interview
with W. Blair Thompson) (five year plan of GM's auto components groups is to get more outside
business). See also W. Blair Thompson; The five-year plan of GM's auto components group is to
get more outside business AUTOMOTrVE NEWS, July 18, 1988 (90% of the sales of GM-built components
are for original equipment and 10% for aftermarket).
158. See supra Section III.A.l.c.(l).
159. The economic effect of such "predatory innovation" is argued in Sidak, supra note 53, and
in Ordover et al., supra note 53.
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replace it with a different brand with lower aftermarket prices. In addition,
purchasers are more likely to obtain comparative parts pricing information when
parts prices will be the largest portion of the cost of using the equipment.
While some parts are manufactured differently from standard or previously
used parts solely to avoid aftermarket competition, these instances are vastly
outnumbered by the designs that vary for technological or other business reasons.
The cost of allowing this monopoly is smaller than the cost of permitting every
different design to be challenged in an antitrust case. It would be sound policy
to rule, as a matter of law, that antitrust liability could not be based on a
decision to use unique parts.
B. Modifications of Copyright Law to Protect Information on
Interchangeability of Parts Between Competing Brands of Equipment
The importance of parts and price information to aftermarket competitors
has been previously discussed in sections II.B.3.b and c above. OEMs have made
that information more difficult to obtain by copyrighting the parts books and
price lists. A number of circuit courts previously followed the "industrious
collection rule," that held compilations of information which was collected
"industriously" or by the "sweat of the brow" could be protected by copyright.,6o
The United States Supreme Court recently rejected that rule, holding that a
copyright protects only the format and selection of the compiled material and
not the information itself.' 6' Therefore, copyright should no longer prevent
aftermarket competitors from using the parts interchangeability and pricing
information in the OEM's parts books.
The ability to copyright the "selection" may, however create a dangerous
ambiguity. If a compilation involves enough selectivity to be copyrightable it may
be argued that copying any part of the compilation is infringement. That seems
clearly incorrect. Copying the "selection" means copying the first compiler's
decisions as to what should be included in and excluded from the compilation.
If the second compiler makes independent selections there is no copying of the
copyrightable element of the compilation, even if information about the companies
selected is copied from the first compilation. That should be made clear either
by court decision or by legislation.
At the same time, the industrious collection rule fulfilled an important
function. Collecting data, such as information on the interchangeability of parts
between competing brands of equipment from scattered sources such as the parts
books of a number of OEMs can be expensive. However, such information is
highly useful to aftermarket competitors who attempt to provide parts and service
for multiple brands. Firms that track down the information and compile it from
the OEMs' parts books or other sources need some form of legal protection for
the information as well as for the form in which it is presented. While calling
that protection "copyright" is inconsistent with the concept that a copyright does
not protect information, protection similar to copyright should be available for
160. See generally Voortman, supra note 13.
161. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Corporation, Inc., 1II S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
See also Bellsouth Advertising and Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc., 933
F.2d 952 (lth Cir. 1991) (format of yellow pages protected, not information itself).
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the information. That will provide the incentive to create interchange books.
That protection should not extend to the OEM's information on parts
interchangeability between models produced by the same manufacturer and to
parts prices contained in the OEM's parts books and price lists. That information
is not "industriously collected" from anywhere. It is the reflection of the design
and pricing decisions of the OEM. 62 If the OEM is allowed to keep the
information from competitors it can extract a monopoly profit from its use
because it can charge a higher price for parts. It is information which the OEM
must and will collect in the course of designing its various models of the equipment
and the OEM can charge for that work in the price of the equipment. This
protection should be available only to those firms that compile data collected
from external sources; not for compilations disclosing the interchangeability of
parts solely between an OEM's own models.
C. Legislation Protecting Designs and Requiring Disclosure of Information
While the foregoing suggestions for clarifying and modifying the antitrust
and copyright laws should encourage aftermarket competition, they are far from
a complete solution to the problem of monopolistic aftermarket prices, particularly
as it results from lack of information by customers and competitors. I suggest
legislation broadly requiring disclosure of information to consumers and after-
market competitors combined with protection against use of the information by
equipment manufacturing competitors. Initially, the legislation should protect
OEMs against copying by competing OEMs of their original parts designs and
specifications and of the other information related to parts embodied in their
original equipment. 63 The protection should, like a copyright, protect against
copying but not against use of a design, even though identical, which was arrived
at independently. The protection should exist without any need for registration
of the design or information though some form of notice might well be required.
Unlike existing copyright law, however, the legislation should include pro-
tection of improvements and functional elements of the design.'6 Most impor-
tantly, unlike existing copyright and patent rights, the right would not be against
the world but only against use in competition with the designer's equipment.
There would be, in effect, a royalty free license to use the design and information
to compete in the aftermarket for the OEM's equipment.
Finally, the legislation would require OEMs to make information about their
original equipment parts available at the request of customers and of persons or
firms seeking to compete in the aftermarket. The required information would
include the identity of any outside suppliers and sufficient details of the plans
162. That is closely parallel to the telephone numbers in the white pages telephone directories
which were involved in Feist. In each case the information is not so much "collected" as "decided"
by the compiler.
163. This proposal is not applicable to those elements of parts designed by the OEM or anyone
else which are different from the part as embodied in the original equipment and designed specially
for the aftermarket. Such elements should be awarded the same degree of protection, whether under
trade secret law or new legislation, as other designs.
164. See supra Section 3.B.
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and specifications of the part to permit duplication. 6  The OEM would be
required to provide the information at a price no greater than the approximate
cost of communicating it to consumers and aftermarket suppliers.'6
It seems clear that enactment of legislation along the lines proposed here
would make aftermarkets more competitive and reduce the prices of aftermarket
parts and services. The principal reasons for monopolistic aftermarket prices are
lack of information by consumers and competitors and lower OEM costs resulting
from the economies of scale and ability to negotiate more favorable terms which
result from the OEM's greater requirements. This proposal would provide infor-
mation directly to relatively sophisticated consumers and independent aftermarket
competitors. In addition it would provide information to unsophisticated consum-
ers who would not themselves review the specifications because it would enable
quality aftermarket competitors to duplicate or improve on the OEM's parts and
advertise that their parts matched or exceeded OEM specifications. Similarly, it
would improve the chances that aftermarket competitors will be able to buy from
the OEM's supplier because they would at least be able to identify the supplier.
The fact that parts are equal to OEM parts and made by the same supplier is
the kind of simplified information likely to be useful to those buyers who would
not examine the specifications themselves. Identification of the OEM's supplier
will enable the independent wholesaler and retailer competitors to at least attempt
to buy from the firm which will often be the lowest cost producer of the part.
The principle problem with the proposed legislation is that requiring disclo-
sure of information, much of which would otherwise be protectable by trade
secret law, might remove an important incentive to invest in improving parts
design. However, the cost of designing parts that increase the value or decrease
.the cost of the original equipment can be largely recouped on the sale of the
equipment if competing OEMs are prevented from copying. 67 Undoubtedly there
also will be some leakage in the case of parts which are inherently superior in
some respect and which competing OEMs would wish to incorporate into their
own equipment. Parts manufactured with the information produced pursuant to
this law will occasionally end up in competing equipment. That should be more
than compensated for by the protection that the proposed legislation gives the
designer against OEM competitors copying through reverse engineering. No
165. The law would not cover secret techniques for manufacturing the part. If others desire to
copy such techniques they presumably reflect improvements for which the developer of the technique
should be compensated. That is different from the specifications and configuration of parts which
usually need to be copied not because they are inherently superior but simply to mesh with the other
components of the equipment.
166. A less radical variation of this proposal would be to make obtaining a copyright, with the
accompanying obligation to provide information, optional. The problem is that probably very few
OEMs would select that option unless the design of the part reflected an improvement which could
be utilized in competing equipment and most such designs would be patentable. The law would not
be used where it is needed most - when the only thing special about the parts is that they have been
designed to mesh with the other components of the original equipment.
167. This may appear inconsistent with the argument in Section I.B that reducing aftermarket
prices will not enable the seller to obtain the same profit by increasing prices for the original
equipment. However, the principal basis for that argument is that the value to the buyer of any
existing OEM policy of low aftermarket prices must be discounted because the policy may be changed.
In contrast, the value to the buyer of any superior components embodied in the original equipment
is a value which the buyer certainly obtains and does so immediately upon purchase of the equipment.
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additional incentive in the form of monopolistic aftermarket prices is required.
While the law would undoubtedly result in some litigation there is no reason
to believe that the cost of the litigation would be any greater than the costs now
incurred in administering programs to preserve, and in litigating the alleged theft
of trade secrets related to aftermarkets. The foregoing proposals should decrease
both the cost of aftermarket parts and services and the combined cost of
purchasing and maintaining equipment over its lifetime without jeopardizing the
incentive to invest in research and development of improved designs of parts and
equipment.
